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Abstract
The predominant game-theoretic solutions for distributed rate-maximization
algorithms in Gaussian interference channels through optimal power control
require perfect channel knowledge, which is not possible in practice due to
various reasons, such as estimation errors, feedback quantization and latency
between channel estimation and signal transmission. This thesis therefore
aims at addressing this issue through the design and analysis of robust game-
theoretic algorithms for rate-maximization in Gaussian interference channels
in the presence of bounded channel uncertainty.
A robust rate-maximization game is formulated for the single-antenna
frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel under bounded channel
uncertainty. The robust-optimization equilibrium solution for this game is
independent of the probability distribution of the channel uncertainty. The
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are studied and sufficient condi-
tions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium are provided. Distributed algo-
rithms to compute the equilibrium solution are presented and shown to have
guaranteed asymptotic convergence when the game has a unique equilibrium.
The sum-rate and the price of anarchy at the equilibrium of this game
are analyzed for the two-user scenario and shown to improve with increase in
channel uncertainty under certain conditions. These results indicate that the
robust solution moves closer to a frequency division multiple access (FDMA)
solution when uncertainty increases. This leads to a higher sum-rate and a
lower price of anarchy for systems where FDMA is globally optimal.
A robust rate-maximization game for multi-antenna Gaussian interfer-
ence channels in the presence of channel uncertainty is also developed along
similar principles. It is shown that this robust game is equivalent to the
nominal game with modified channel matrices. The robust-optimization
equilibrium for this game and a distributed algorithm for its computation
are presented and characterized. Sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of
the equilibrium and asymptotic convergence of the algorithm are presented.
Numerical simulations are used to confirm the behaviour of these algo-
rithms. The analytical and numerical results of this thesis indicate that
channel uncertainty is not necessarily detrimental, but can indeed result in
improvement of performance of networks in particular situations, where the
Nash equilibrium solution is quite inefficient and channel uncertainty leads
to reduced greediness of users.
I dedicate this thesis to my early mentors:
My grandfather, Y. K. Nanjundaiah
S. R. Madhu Rao
M. N. Krishna Swamy
K. Ramamurthy
V. Kesavan
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Statement of Originality
The following aspects of this thesis are believed to be original:
• The extension of the MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm to broad-
band Gaussian interference channels and the study of the effect of
channel estimation errors on the performance of the MIMO iterative
algorithm in Chapter 3.
• The robust rate-maximization game formulation for frequency-selective
SISO Gaussian interference channels and the analysis of its equilibrium
(Theorem 4.2 on page 105) in Chapter 4.
• The analysis of the effect of channel uncertainty on the sum-rate in
the robust SISO rate-maximization game for the two-user case (The-
orem 5.1 on page 125 and Theorem 5.2 on page 128) in Chapter 5.
• The robust rate-maximization game formulation for MIMO Gaussian
interference channels in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications technology has become an ubiquitous element of
our society, ranging from remote controllers and paging systems to cellular
phones and wireless local area networks. With the advent of better battery
technology and the relentless progress of Moore’s law, today’s portable de-
vices can support a great amount of processing power. This has led to an
exponential increase in the usage of portable devices such as cellular phones,
tablet computers and laptops for data-intensive broadband internet applica-
tions (Figure 1.1).
This huge increase in demand has led to heavy congestion in the radio-
frequency (RF) spectrum allocated to these applications. Issues such as call
dropping, low download speeds and sporadic availability of network access
have become commonplace, particularly in areas with high density of users.
This was exemplified at the launch of the popular iPhone 4 cell-phone last
year, when Steve Jobs (CEO of Apple Inc.), who is famous for delivering
impeccable product-launches, had to briefly suspend the launch midway as
the demonstration phone could not access the network. He finally had to
18
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Figure 1.1: Projected number of subscriptions (in billions) for mobile
broadband and wired broadband internet connections globally [1].
request the 500+ members of the audience to turn off their WiFi devices in
order to continue the demonstration [2].
1.1 Radio frequency bands and spectrum management
Wireless communication devices for various applications and services oper-
ate in specific pre-determined ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum called
radio frequency (RF) bands. The radio waves used for communication are
transmitted and received through antennas which transform electrical en-
ergy to radio waves that propagate through the atmosphere from the source
to the destination. Due to varying propagation characteristics of radio waves
of different frequencies, specific applications are allocated specific RF bands.
For instance, the RF spectrum allocation in the United States of Amer-
ica is presented in Figure 1.2. These allocations are determined by various
Section 1.1. Radio frequency bands and spectrum management 20
national and international regulatory bodies (e.g.: the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) in the USA and the Office of Communications
(Ofcom) in the UK).
When multiple wireless devices operate in the same environment, they
often interfere with each other. Spectrum management is needed to control
the usage of RF spectrum in order to mitigate interference among wire-
less devices and services. The current practice for spectrum allocation by
regulatory bodies is known as the command-and-control model [4]. In this
approach, the regulators make centralized decisions regarding spectrum al-
location and usage, often through an auctioning process commonly referred
to as a spectrum auction. After a successful bid, a user/company is awarded
the allocation, which is often valid for extended periods of time and over
large geographical regions. While the majority of the RF spectrum is man-
aged under this scheme, a small region of the RF spectrum, known as the
industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band, is unlicensed and open to any
device/application. Some of the technologies using these band are cord-
less telephony, bluetooth radio, wireless local area networking and radio-
frequency identification (RFID).
The command-and-control model of spectrum management and alloca-
tion ensures interference-free operation for the licensed user as it is operating
in the band exclusively. Since most of the spectrum is already allocated
to various applications (Figure 1.2), emerging wireless applications such
as wireless broadband communications face an apparent spectrum scarcity.
Section 1.1. Radio frequency bands and spectrum management 21
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However, field studies on actual spectrum usage have shown that the cur-
rent spectrum management policy results in highly inefficient spectrum uti-
lization (Figure 1.3). This has led to the evolution of new paradigms and
technologies for future spectrum management models and wireless commu-
nication devices which aim to improve the efficiency of their own spectrum
utilization and to exploit the inefficiency of licensed spectrum users.
1.2 Emerging wireless paradigms and technologies
The growing demand for high-throughput wireless communication has led
to the emergence of new paradigms and technologies as contenders for next-
generation wireless communication networks. In this section, a few of these,
namely cognitive radio, dynamic spectrum access, orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) and multi-antenna systems are briefly de-
scribed.
1.2.1 Cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum access
Cognitive radio is an emerging paradigm of wireless communication in which
an intelligent wireless system utilizes information about the radio environ-
ment to adapt its operating characteristics in order to ensure reliable com-
munication and efficient spectrum utilization [6]. The main goal of this
paradigm is to enable the cognitive radio to exploit the inefficiently utilized
licensed spectrum for its own communication needs without significantly af-
fecting the licensed user. The band of RF spectrum that is licensed to a user
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(a) Overall spectrum occupancy measured at seven locations
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(b) Measured spectrum occupancy in the 30 MHz-3,000 MHz range averaged over
the seven locations
Figure 1.3: Average spectrum occupancy measured at seven locations
in the USA in the 30 MHz-3,000 MHz range demonstrating inefficient
spectrum utilization [5].
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Time
Dynamic
spectrum
access
Frequency
Spectrum in use
“Spectrum hole”
Power
Figure 1.4: Concept of spectrum hole represented in power, time and
frequency space wherein there is an opportunity for a cognitive radio
to operate [7].
but is not utilized by the licensed user at a particular time and location is
called a spectrum hole (Figure 1.4).
One of the key enabling technologies for cognitive radio is dynamic spec-
trum access. The overarching idea behind dynamic spectrum access is to
temporarily borrow unused spectrum from licensed users (spectrum holes)
without interfering with their operation [8]. Research on various aspects of
cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum access has received a great deal of
interest in recent times [9, 10, 11, 12, 13] and will help design wireless com-
munication systems of the future.
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1.2.2 OFDM technology
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) is a frequency-division
multiplexing scheme developed to transmit multiple digital signals simulta-
neously over a large number of closely-spaced orthogonal sub-carriers [14].
OFDM transmission is used for wideband digital communication, both wired
and wireless, and has been adopted for a variety of applications, ranging from
digital television to wireless networking.
OFDM technology has many advantages. It has a high spectral effi-
ciency and is resilient to interference and multipath effects. It can also
easily adapt to severe channel conditions without complicated time-domain
equalization and can be efficiently implemented using the fast Fourier trans-
form. However, OFDM technology is quite sensitive to Doppler shift and
frequency-synchronization issues, despite which it has become the de-facto
physical (PHY) layer broadband transmission technology and is particularly
advantageous for multiple access systems.
1.2.3 Multi-antenna technology
Multiple antennas at the receiver and/or transmitter of a wireless commu-
nication system can be used to improve link performance [15]. The term
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is used to describe systems which
exploit such antenna diversity. MIMO technology can significantly improve
the data throughput and coverage without additional bandwidth or trans-
mission power. This is because signals transmitted from multiple antennas
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experience differing multipath fading and are received by multiple anten-
nas. The different multipath signals can be combined coherently to achieve
higher data rates and/or lower bit-error rates by using clever signal process-
ing techniques. However, this can significantly increase the complexity of
the communication system.
1.3 Motivation
The aforementioned technologies and paradigms are integral features of to-
day’s high performance networks and/or are strong contenders for wireless
networks of tomorrow. OFDM and MIMO technologies are already exten-
sively used in wireless networks through standards such as IEEE 802.11n and
WiMAX. They are also strong candidate technologies for the next-generation
of wireless communication networks [16,17,18], which will incorporate prin-
ciples of cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum access [19, 20].
A prominent feature of these paradigms is the provision for greater free-
dom of action for the users in the network. In such a network, “intelligent”
users actively and dynamically manage the resources and characteristics of
their transceivers, such as transmit power and bandwidth, in order to op-
timize their communication performance in terms of various criteria such
as information rate, utilized power and achieved quality-of-service (QoS).
With the advent of cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum access, multiple
heterogenous wireless technologies and standards of tomorrow are expected
to function seamlessly in the same environment and RF spectrum [21]. In
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such a setting, interference among the users1 becomes a critical issue and
precludes the traditional approach of interference mitigation through prede-
termined non-overlapping frequency allocation (FDMA) due to significant
demands on coordination among the users. This form of centralized control
determining the communication parameters of users leads to heavy signalling
overhead as information from all the users needs to be collected, processed
and disseminated by the controller.
The issue of maximizing information rates of users in an interference
channel by optimizing the power spectral density of the transmitted signal
under certain power constraints is of interest in this thesis. The sum-rate
maximization problem in a frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel
has been proved to be NP-hard [22] and the optimal solution of this problem
is of the form of frequency division multiple access (FDMA) [23]. Thus, a
centralized solution to this problem not only requires information (in the
form of channel state information and noise variances) from all users, but
also is computationally unattractive.
The solution to these limitations lies in the framework of distributed algo-
rithms, which enable users of the network to compute their optimal solutions
autonomously with limited (locally available) information. The analysis of
such a system of multiple interactive autonomous intelligent users operating
in the same environment falls well within the purview of game theory, which
1Such a system with multi-user interference in a frequency-selective medium (as
seen in OFDM transmission) can be modelled as an interference channel, described
in Section 3.3 on page 61.
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was devised to analyze and predict the outcome of situations where multi-
ple entities (typically people, companies and nations) interact. In addition,
solutions from such a game-theoretic analysis can often be implemented as
distributed algorithms. These factors make game theory an attractive tool
for the design and analysis of tomorrow’s wireless communication networks.
Indeed, it has been shown that the problem of maximizing information rates
of users in an interference channel, which is of interest in this thesis, can be
modelled as a noncooperative game [24].
However, a vast majority of game-theoretic solutions proposed for wire-
less networks in the current literature, including the rate-maximization game,
assumes perfect knowledge of channel state information, which is not pos-
sible in practice, where such information is estimated with a certain degree
of uncertainty. This uncertainty could be introduced though several mecha-
nisms, such as estimation errors, feedback quantization and latency between
channel estimation and signal transmission. If these solutions are to be
implemented in practice, the effect of such uncertainty on the perfor-
mance of these game-theoretic solutions needs to be characterized
and robust game-theoretic algorithms which perform satisfacto-
rily in spite of such uncertainty need to be designed and analyzed.
This issue of uncertainty in the parameters of game-theoretic solutions is the
central theme of this thesis.
In summary, the design of distributed algorithms based on ideas
from game theory for maximizing the information rates of users
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having limited transmit power in single-antenna and multi-antenna
interference channels with uncertainty in channel state informa-
tion is the focus of this thesis.
1.4 Thesis outline
The aforementioned approaches and issues are addressed over the following
chapters of this thesis:
Chapter 2: Game Theory: Fundamentals, Nash Equilibrium and
Robust Game Theory
This chapter presents a brief description of the game-theoretic concepts that
are of interest in this thesis. The chapter begins with an introduction to
game theory and the conditions needed for its application in a given sce-
nario, described in Section 2.1 on page 35. This is followed by a discussion
on strategic noncooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium in
Section 2.2 on page 40 and the notion of equilibrium efficiency as a method
to quantify the quality of the Nash equilibrium solution in Section 2.3 on
page 42.
In Section 2.4 on page 45, a discussion on some of the limitations of
the Nash equilibrium concept and the traditional game-theoretic approach
to the issue of uncertainty in games is presented. Finally, the robust game
model, which is a union of ideas from robust optimization theory and game
theory, is introduced in Section 2.5 on page 47 as a suitable candidate for
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resolving the issue of uncertainty in channel state information affecting the
performance of game-theoretic solutions.
Chapter:3: Iterative Waterfilling Algorithms
This chapter presents a specific game-theoretic solution and its associated
conceptual and mathematical foundations within which the issue of channel
uncertainty is investigated in this thesis. This includes results from contrac-
tion and fixed point theory, which addresses the formulation and character-
ization of distributed algorithms (Section 3.1 on page 52) and information
theory, which introduce the waterfilling solution as the optimal solution to
the problem of rate-maximization in a single-user context (Section 3.2 on
page 57). This is followed by the description of the Gaussian interference
channel in the multi-user scenario and a review of the current literature using
game theory to address the problem of rate-maximization in this medium in
Section 3.3 on page 61.
The predominant game-theoretic solution, namely the iterative water-
filling algorithm (IWFA), to the problem of rate-maximization in single-
antenna frequency-selective Gaussian interference channels and multi-antenna
(MIMO) Gaussian interference channels are presented respectively in Sec-
tion 3.4 on page 66 and Section 3.5 on page 72 and extended to broadband
MIMO Gaussian interference channels in Section 3.6 on page 80.
Finally, in Section 3.7 on page 85, the effect of channel state information
errors on the performance of the MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm is
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investigated, which demonstrates the need for robust solutions presented in
the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4: Robust IWFA for SISO Frequency-Selective Systems
In this chapter, the analytic framework for a robust formulation of the rate-
maximization game for single-input single-output (SISO) frequency-selective
Gaussian interference channels is presented. Section 4.1 on page 93 is a re-
view of the state-of-the-art in methods that address and investigate the is-
sue of channel state information uncertainty in rate-maximization games for
Gaussian interference channels. The system under consideration is described
in Section 4.2 on page 95. A distribution-free robust rate-maximization game
based on the robust game model is formulated in Section 4.3 on page 98. The
optimal solution of each user in the form of a robust waterfilling operation
is derived and characterized in Section 4.4 on page 100.
In Section 4.5 on page 104, the equilibrium solution of this game, termed
the robust-optimization equilibrium, is presented and shown to exist for possi-
ble channel values and initializations, and further, to be unique under certain
sufficient conditions. A distributed algorithm to compute the equilibrium so-
lution iteratively is presented and proved to asymptotically converge when a
unique equilibrium is guaranteed in Section 4.6 on page 105. Finally, numer-
ical simulations to confirm the behaviour of the algorithm are presented in
Section 4.7 on page 108, where an interesting effect of increase in sum-rate
with greater channel uncertainty is observed, which merits further analysis.
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Chapter 5: Sum-Rate Analysis in the Two-User Scenario
This chapter is an analytical investigation of the improvement in sum-rate
with greater channel uncertainty in the robust SISO rate-maximization game
proposed in Chapter 4 for the two-user case. To begin with, the effect of
increasing channel uncertainty on the sum-rate and the price of anarchy of a
simple two-frequency system are analyzed in Section 5.1 on page 124. Based
on these results, conditions for improvement in the sum-rate and the price
of anarchy of a system with asymptotically large number of frequencies with
an increase in uncertainty are derived in Section 5.2 on page 127. Finally,
these results are supported using simulations in Section 5.3 on page 129.
Chapter 6: Robust IWFA for MIMO Systems
In this chapter, a robust rate-maximization game in MIMO Gaussian inter-
ference channels in the presence of bounded channel uncertainty is developed.
The system model for which the robust game is developed is described in
Section 6.1 on page 151. A robust MIMO rate-maximization game for this
system is formulated and shown to be a modified MIMO rate-maximization
game (Section 3.5) in Section 6.2 on page 153. The robust-optimization
equilibrium for this game and an iterative waterfilling algorithm to compute
it are presented, along with sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the
equilibrium and asymptotic convergence of the algorithm, in Section 6.3 on
page 157. The behaviour of the algorithm under different settings is con-
firmed though numerical simulations in Section 6.4 on page 161.
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Chapter 7: Summary, Conclusions and Future Work
The novel results of this thesis and their conclusions are summarized in
Section 7.1 on page 167. The work presented in this thesis could be extended
in various directions, some of which are described in Section 7.2 on page 171.
Chapter 2
GAME THEORY —
FUNDAMENTALS, NASH
EQUILIBRIUM AND ROBUST
GAME THEORY
The past decade has seen the increasing application of concepts from game
theory in wireless communication systems to solve a variety of problems
[25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Game theory has been utilized to solve various
resource allocations problems in different scenarios and the problems con-
sidered involve bandwidth allocation, power control, medium access control,
flow control, routing and pricing issues in wireless networks [32]. Game
theory has also been extensively applied in cognitive radio and dynamic
spectrum access, particularly to solve issues in spectrum management and
spectrum sharing [33,34,35,36,37].
34
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In this chapter, a brief overview of game-theoretic concepts relevant to
this thesis is presented. The chapter begins with an introduction to game
theory and a brief discussion on the classification of games. This is followed
by a description of the strategic noncooperative game model, the Nash equi-
librium and the notion of equilibrium efficiency. Finally, the robust game
model is introduced as a way of moving beyond the concept of the Nash
equilibrium in static noncooperative games having uncertainty in payoff func-
tions, with the marriage of ideas from robust optimization theory and game
theory.
2.1 Introduction to game theory
Game theory is a collection of mathematical tools designed for the analysis
of situations where decision-makers meet and interact. In such situations,
the success of individual decision-makers depends on the actions of others.
Though game theory was developed to analyze and understand economic
behaviour [38, 39], the underlying concepts of game theory are far-reaching
and have seen applications in diverse fields such as biology, political science,
international relations, computer science, engineering, social psychology, phi-
losophy and management.
In its broadest sense, a game is a description of strategic interaction
among decision makers, termed as players. It specifies the constraints on
the players when deciding on a possible action, but does not state what
action they decide to take. A solution concept of a game refers to a formal
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rule that predicts the actions of the players when the game is played. These
predictions are called solutions and describe the action each player will select,
which is called a strategy. The most common form of the solution concept
is the equilibrium concept. At an equilibrium, the various forces influencing
the game are balanced and the players will not change their strategies in the
absence of external influences.
Game theory is built upon the theory of rational choice, which assumes
that the action decided by a player is at least as good as every other available
action. The players are also assumed to reason strategically by taking into
account the possible actions of other players while deciding their own actions.
In order to apply game theory to analyze a given scenario, a few basic
requirements need to be satisfied. First of all, there must be well-defined
decision making processes in the scenario. Also, the decisions from these
processes should have a predictable impact on performance. This is typically
achieved by clearly identifying the players of the game and specifying their
preferences explicitly through utility/payoff functions which are mappings
from the set of possible actions to the profits delivered. Furthermore, in order
to ensure that the scenario being modelled does not result in a trivial game,
there must be multiple interactive decision makers and each decision maker
must have multiple possible actions. The term “interactive” in this context
indicates that the actions of any decision maker should have an impact on
the actions of the others. In other words, the scenario being modelled as
a game should not be a simple single-objective optimization problem. In
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most cases, having a multi-user scenario with a separate objective function
for each user will be adequate for this to be ensured.1
Traditionally, game theory was developed in order to analyze and pre-
dict the outcomes of situations, particularly in economics, wherein multiple
decision makers interacted, given their decision making processes. In a com-
munications network context, this implies that applying game theory in this
fashion will help to predict the performance of networks and to analyze the
effect of various network parameters on the network performance when the
users are operating under a certain protocol or utilizing a specified algorithm.
In engineering (and particularly in communications), there is a great
range of decision making processes and possible actions that could exist in a
certain scenario (system), unlike in the case of economics or political science
where people, companies and nations are being modelled. Further, in the
case of economics or political science, the game-theorist has little control or
influence on the actions of the set of people, companies or nations being mod-
elled and game theory is primarily an analytical tool in such cases. However,
there could be certain specific decision making processes and ranges of ac-
tions whose outcome predicted by game theory is more desirable than others,
which indicates that game theory could also be used as a design tool. In a
1This does not necessarily mean that game theory is only applicable in multi-user
problems. In some cases, inventing fictitious users playing an imaginary game may
be useful in achieving a desired solution. For instance, a single-user robust (worst-
case) power allocation problem in MIMO channels with no channel information or
statistics has been analyzed by modelling the problem as a user vs. malicious-nature
game [40] . In this case, the interaction between the user and nature occurs through
the varying levels of receiver noise of the user.
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communications network setting, this translates to designing (engineering!)
the protocols or algorithms utilized by the users in the network in order to
achieve specific predetermined performance targets at the user and/or net-
work level.2 It is this “engineering” perspective of applying game theory as
a design tool that is of great interest in the field of wireless communications
and networking.
2.1.1 Types of games
A game is a mathematical model of interacting decision makers and has
three basic components [42]:
• a set of players
• a set of actions (for each player)
• a set of preferences (for each player)
The set of actions of each player is called the set of admissible strategies
or the strategy space. The preferences of each player are typically specified
using payoff/utility functions which explicitly describe the relation between
actions and profits.
There is a huge diversity in game-theoretic approaches and classifying
this seemingly bewildering variety of games under a universal classification
2This is quite similar to the concept of reverse engineering [41], where the goal is
to discover/reinvent the process that resulted in a solution/product, given the final
solution/product, through the analysis of its structure, function and operation.
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scheme is not easy. This has led to many classifications of game-theoretic
methods along different criteria, some of which are:
• Cooperative and noncooperative games: If the players in a game
are aiming to mutually benefit by reliably cooperating with each other,
this leads to cooperative games. On the other hand, if the users are
aiming to improve only their own selfish objectives, the game is said
to be noncooperative.
• Static and dynamic games: These are also known as strategic
games and extensive games, respectively. In static games, all play-
ers make their decisions simultaneously (or if at different points in
time, without knowing other players’ strategies), whereas in dynamic
games, there is a temporal component where the players may take
turns to make decisions or play the game repeatedly and try to take
advantage of knowing the history of the game.
• Zero-sum and non-zero-sum games: In zero-sum games (and
more generally, constant-sum games), the total available resources in
the game is constant and unaffected by the players’ actions, with the
gain by any player being offset by a corresponding loss of others. How-
ever, in non-zero-sum games, the total available resources in the game
is not constant and depends on the strategies of the players. In such
cases, a careful design of the game may lead to improvement of many
or all the payoffs of the players in the game.
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• Symmetric and asymmetric games: In symmetric games, all the
players have identical payoff functions and strategy-spaces and the
payoff for a particular strategy is independent of the identity of the
player. However, in asymmetric games this is not the case, where
the payoff functions and/or strategy-spaces are non-identical and the
payoffs of the players are non-identical.
The games considered in this thesis are static noncooperative asymmet-
ric non-zero-sum games. In the following section, a brief description of the
strategic noncooperative game and its solution concept, the Nash equilib-
rium, is presented.
2.2 Static noncooperative game — Nash equilibrium
This section formalizes the strategic noncooperative game model and the
definition of the Nash equilibrium solution concept.3
Consider the following static noncooperative game, G :
• Set of players: Ω = {1, . . . , Q}.
• Set of admissible strategies (Strategy-space): Aq 6= { } ∀q ∈ Ω.
• Payoff (Utility) functions: Uq(aq,a−q) : A1 × · · · × AQ 7→ R ∀q ∈ Ω
3The discussion presented here has been limited to pure strategies, i.e., actions
that are deterministic. The notions presented here have been extended to mixed
strategies, where the pure strategies are associated with a probability of applica-
tion. However, as all the games discussed in this thesis have pure strategies, game-
theoretic concepts involving mixed strategies are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Refer to [42,43] among others for further information on mixed strategies.
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where aq ∈ Aq and a−q = {ai}i6=q.
where each player is assumed to know the strategy-space and payoff func-
tions of every other player. This knowledge is not always necessary in all
noncooperative games. For instance, in the robust MIMO rate-maximization
game analyzed in Section 6.2 on page 153, the players do not explicit share
any information.
The solution concept of this game is the famous Nash equilibrium, based
on the concepts introduced by Nobel Prize winner John Nash in [44,45]. The
notion of a Nash equilibrium is presented in the following result:
Proposition 2.1. Given the game G , the joint strategy a∗ , [a∗1, . . . , a
∗
Q] is
a Nash equilibrium if
Uq(a
∗
q ,a
∗
−q) ≥ Uq(aq,a
∗
−q) ∀aq ∈ Aq, ∀q ∈ Ω. (2.2.1)
In other words, no single player can profit by unilaterally deviating from
a Nash equilibrium. An alternate interpretation of the Nash equilibrium is
through the concept of best response strategies. A best response strategy of
a player is the action (or set of actions) which results in the most favourable
outcome for a player, given other players’ strategies. At the Nash equilib-
rium, each player’s strategy is a best response to all other strategies in the
equilibrium. Thus, the Nash equilibrium of a game can be said to be a
joint-best-response strategy of the players.
The question of whether a given game has any equilibrium or not is one
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that has been extensively investigated over the years. Most of these are built
upon various fixed point theorems,4,5 and present various conditions under
which a game will be guaranteed to have an equilibrium (Refer to [50] for
a detailed treatment on the topic). A further question to be addressed is
whether there is a unique Nash equilibrium in a game, and if so, ways to
compute it. This is because the equilibrium solution concept only indicates
that if the players are initialized with a Nash equilibrium solution, then they
will continue to remain there. It does not specify the dynamics of the game,
and how long the players may take to converge to an equilibrium, if they
converge at all.
2.3 Equilibrium efficiency
The “joint-best-response” interpretation of the Nash equilibrium is of sig-
nificant interest when dealing with distributed optimization. It implies that
each player is at a locally optimal solution which can be computed by a
distributed algorithm whose convergence properties could be characterized
and analyzed. This leads to the idea of competitive optimality, where each
player in a competitive environment settles down to a (locally) optimal sta-
ble solution. The term “optimality” here is slightly fallacious and this idea
4It is interesting that the equivalence between the Nash equilibrium and the
concept of a fixed point is only mentioned in passing, if at all, in most general
textbooks on game theory, when John Nash’s work is actually built on this inter-
pretation, using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [46] in his seminal paper [44] to
prove the existence of an equilibrium.
5A few of the important fixed point theorems in game theory are the ones by
Brouwer [47], Lefschetz [48], Hopf [49] and Kakutani [46].
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should be applied with caution. This is because the emphasis in such an
approach is on achieving a stable (stationary) situation in the game with
all the players settling to a single action each, rather than an emphasis on
optimizing the total (or individual) utility of the players in the game. In
fact, there is no guarantee that such a decentralized noncooperative solution
will yield a utility as good as one from a centralized optimization approach.
This leads to the concept of equilibrium efficiency which tries to quantify
this issue and measure the trade-off between achieving decentralized control
and having globally optimal solutions.
The popular measures of equilibrium efficiency are as follows:
1. Social welfare
2. Pareto optimality
3. Price of anarchy/stability
2.3.1 Social welfare
Given the joint strategy a , [a1, . . . , aQ], the social welfare of game G is
defined as the sum of all the utilities of the players
w(a) =
Q∑
q=1
Uq(aq,a−q) (2.3.1)
When the payoff functions of the players are the information rates of the
users (as is the case in this thesis), the social welfare is equivalent to the
sum-rate of the system.
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2.3.2 Pareto optimality
A solution is Pareto optimal if there is no possible way to improve the payoff
of a (non-empty) subset of players without leaving any other player worse-off.
Proposition 2.2. Given the game G , a joint strategy a∗ , [a∗1, . . . , a
∗
Q] is
said to Pareto optimal if there does NOT exist any a ∈ A1 × · · · × AQ such
that
U(a) > U(a∗) (2.3.2)
where U(a) , [U1(a1,a−1), . . . , UQ(aQ,a−Q)].
The set of solutions which are Pareto optimal forms the boundary of the
joint-utility region of the game and is known as the Pareto frontier [51].
2.3.3 Price of anarchy and price of stability
The concept of price of anarchy, introduced in [52], aims to measure the
“price of uncoordinated individual utility-maximizing decisions”. Together
with the price of stability, it helps quantify the trade-off between having
distributed algorithms and optimal social welfare.
The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio between the objective function
value at the socially optimal solution and the worst objective function value
at any equilibrium of the game [53]. The price of stability is defined as the
ratio between the objective function value at the socially optimal solution
and the best objective function value at any equilibrium of the game [53].
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Thus, in game G ,
PoA =
max
a∈A
w(a)
min
a∈ANE
w(a)
PoS =
max
a∈A
w(a)
max
a∈ANE
w(a)
(2.3.3)
where A , A1 × · · · × AQ is the joint strategy space, ANE is the set of
Nash equilibrium solutions and w(a) is the social welfare of the game as
defined in (2.3.1). Note that PoA ≥ PoS ≥ 1 and that a lower price of
anarchy indicates a more efficient game. Thus, price of anarchy and price
of stability help quantify the worst-case and best-case equilibrium efficiency
respectively. In games with unique Nash equilibrium solutions, such as the
ones considered in this thesis, the price of anarchy and stability are identical.
2.4 Moving beyond Nash equilibrium — robust game theory
The Nash equilibrium concept discussed in the previous section is one of the
cornerstones of noncooperative game theory and has been utilized to solve
a great many problems in a diverse range of applications. However, the
concept of Nash equilibrium is not without limitations. As seen in the pre-
vious section, the Nash equilibrium concept generally provides a distributed
solution at the cost of equilibrium efficiency. However, it suffers from scala-
bility issues. In games with large number of players and large action spaces,
the computation of the Nash equilibrium solution and the verification of
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the conditions for existence and/or uniqueness often become inefficient or
even intractable. Furthermore, these costly computations to evaluate the
equilibrium solution may not even be Pareto optimal.
The scalability issue is even more complicated in large games as they
typically yield large number of equilibria and could result in a high price
of anarchy. In such a scenario, it is quite difficult to predict which equilib-
rium is achieved or to ensure that a specific subset of equilibria is achieved
as different initializations could lead to different equilibria. Techniques to
identify and select an appropriate equilibrium in such cases lead to the the-
ory of equilibrium selection [54]. The issue of multiple equilibria is not of
importance in this thesis as the focus of the methodologies here are in en-
suring a unique equilibrium and ways to compute it easily in a distributed
fashion, which is presented in Section 3.1 on page 52. Scalability issues in
large games are beyond the scope of this thesis and is a possible avenue of
future research.
Another limitation of the concept of Nash equilibrium is that it assumes
complete knowledge of all the players’ actions by each player and that these
actions and the payoffs of each player are known accurately. However, this
might not be possible in many cases and the players are often uncertain
about some aspects of the game. Uncertainty in the payoffs of the play-
ers is of particular interest in this thesis, as perfect knowledge of channel
state information is not available in wireless networking games. Thus, alter-
nate equilibrium concepts which model the presence of uncertainty need to
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considered.
The traditional game-theoretic solution to the uncertainty issue is Harsanyi’s
Bayesian game model [55,56,57] which is essentially analogous to the stochas-
tic programming approach [51] to uncertainty in data-sets in optimization
theory. In the Bayesian game model, each player aims to maximize the
expected payoff, given the full prior probability distribution of all the pa-
rameters with uncertainty. This model assumes that all the players have
the same prior probability distribution and is known to all the players. Al-
though this model has been extended to relax the assumptions of common
prior and common knowledge, the drawback of this approach is that it is dif-
ficult, in practice, to estimate the prior probability distributions accurately
and often leads to complicated probability distributions which results in the
analysis of the game being intractable. Thus, it is desirable to move to novel
“distribution-free” game models, which are defined to be independent of the
prior probability distributions of the parameters with uncertainty.
2.5 Robust game model
The robust game model, proposed independently in [58,59], incorporates the
concept of robust optimization [60], which is independent of the probability
distribution of the parameters with uncertainty, into the framework of static
noncooperative game theory. This approach models incomplete-information
games as distribution-free robust games where the players use a worst-case
robust optimization approach to counter bounded payoff uncertainty. The
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solution of this robust game model is a distribution-free equilibrium concept
called the robust-optimization equilibrium.6 In [58], the robust game model
is proposed for finite N-person games with linear payoff functions and un-
certainty in the parameters of the payoff function. The robust game model
proposed in [59] is for two-person games (bimatrix games) with linear pay-
off functions and uncertainty in the actions of the opposing player and each
player’s payoff function parameters. This model has been extended in [61] to
N-person games with nonlinear payoff functions, where it is reformulated as
second-order cone complementary problems in order to solve certain classes
of games. The work presented in this thesis is based on the robust game
model in [58].
In worst-case robust optimization [51], the parameters are assumed to
belong to “uncertainty sets” (set of all possible parameter values), and the
objective function is optimized for the worst-case parameter value (i.e., the
parameter value which results in the worst objective function value). In the
robust game model, each player formulates a best response as the
solution to a worst-case optimization problem. It is to be noted that
the players apply a worst-case perspective only to the uncertain parameters
that define their own payoff functions, given the actions of the other players,
and that the actions of other players are beyond the scope of consideration of
each player. In other words, the optimization performed by each player is for
6The equilibrium concept is called “robust Nash equilibrium” in [59] and “robust-
optimization equilibrium” in [58]. In this thesis, the term robust-optimization equi-
librium is used exclusively in order to highlight the fact that this concept has its
roots in robust optimization theory.
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worst-case payoff function parameters (presumably determined by “nature”)
and not for worst-case actions of the other players.
If it is commonly known to all players that each one of them is adopt-
ing the above robust-optimization approach to payoff function uncertainty,
then it is possible for the players to mutually predict each other’s behaviour,
similar to the complete-information game whose solution is the Nash equi-
librium.7 The players reach an equilibrium when their mutual predictions
coincide and this leads to the notion of the robust-optimization equilibrium.
This robust game approach is utilized in Chapters 4 and 6 to formulate
a robust rate-maximization game in the presence of bounded channel uncer-
tainty in SISO frequency-selective and MIMO Gaussian interference channels
(For a discussion on Gaussian interference channels, refer to Section 3.3 on
page 61).
2.6 Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the various concepts and methodolo-
gies from game theory that are of interest in the thesis. A brief introduction
to game theory and the underlying assumptions needed to apply game the-
ory were discussed. This was followed by a review of some of the commonly
7Since the players of the complete-information noncooperative game are rational
and know the payoffs and action-space of each other, each player can compute the
best responses of every other player, which will help predict the actions of the
other users. Based on these predictions, each player formulates a best response
strategy. The Nash equilibrium is the set of all mutually-coinciding predictions of
the players. This idea may not be not straightforward to apply in practice, where
all the information may not be available and multiple equilibria could exist.
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observed types of games. Following this, the strategic noncooperative game
model and the Nash equilibrium solution concept were formally defined and
explained. The concept of equilibrium efficiency and measures to quantify
it were then presented. The subsequent section elaborated some of the limi-
tations of the Nash equilibrium and reviewed the traditional game-theoretic
approach to address the issue of uncertainty. Finally, the concept of robust
game theory as an amalgamation of approaches from robust optimization
theory and game theory was explored.
Chapter 3
ITERATIVE WATERFILLING
ALGORITHMS
This chapter presents the conceptual foundations and specific game-theoretic
problem formulations on which the contributions of this thesis are based.
The chapter starts with a brief overview of relevant results in contraction
mappings and fixed point theory. This is followed by a brief summary of clas-
sical single-user waterfilling solutions. Next, the issue of rate-maximization
in multi-user Gaussian interference channels is considered and the predom-
inant game-theoretic approach to competitive rate-maximization in single
antenna and multi-antenna Gaussian interference channels is outlined. The
effect of channel estimation errors on the performance of this method is then
investigated, setting the stage for the robust solutions proposed in this thesis
in subsequent chapters. Finally, a short appendix on Karush-Kuhn–Tucker
conditions is included for completeness.
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3.1 Contraction and fixed point theory
In this section, some of the central concepts involved in solving nonlinear
problems using distributed iterative algorithms are summarized (Refer to [62]
for a rigorous treatment of the topic). The key motivation behind using these
well-studied analytical tools lies in the interpretation of the Nash equilibrium
as a fixed point and the representation of the waterfilling function as an
Euclidean projection, enabling its interpretation as a contraction mapping.
3.1.1 Existence and uniqueness of a fixed point
Let F : X 7→ X be any mapping from a subset X ⊆ Rn to itself which is
associated to a dynamic system described by
x(n+ 1) = F
(
x(n)
)
, n ∈ N+ = {0, 1, 2, . . . }, (3.1.1)
where x(n) ∈ Rn is the state variable vector at discrete-time n, with x(0) ∈
R
n. If this mapping has the property
∥∥F(x)− F(y)∥∥ ≤ α∥∥x− y∥∥, ∀ x,y ∈ X , (3.1.2)
with ‖ ·‖ being some norm and α being a constant in the interval [0, 1), then
such a mapping is called a contraction mapping. The scalar α is called the
modulus of F. A mapping F : X 7→ Y where X ,Y ⊂ Rn that satisfies (3.1.2),
is also called a contraction mapping, even if X 6= Y.
Any vector x∗ ∈ X satisfying x∗ = F(x∗) is called a fixed point of the
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mapping and the relation (3.1.1) can be seen as an iterative algorithm to
compute such a fixed point. This is possible because x∗ is a fixed point if F
is continuous at x∗ and the sequence {x(n)} converges to x∗.
The following result provides the conditions for the existence and unique-
ness of such a fixed point [63]:
Theorem 3.1. Given the dynamic system in (3.1.1) with F : X 7→ X and
X ⊆ Rn,
Existence: If X is nonempty, convex and compact1, and F is a continuous
mapping, then there exists some x∗ such that x∗ = F(x∗);
Uniqueness: If X is closed and F is a contraction mapping in some vector
norm ‖ · ‖, with modulus α ∈ [0, 1), then the fixed point of F is unique.
It is noteworthy that the conditions in Theorem 3.1 are only sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a fixed point of a dynamic
system. Further, this result, more specifically the contraction mapping, is
norm-dependent. It is possible for mappings to be contractive under some
norm and yet fail to be a contraction under a different norm. Thus, the
choice of a suitable norm is critical in the application of this theorem. On the
other hand, this flexibility in the choice of norm could lead to a more varied
characterization of sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
the fixed point of the mapping under different norms.
1A subset of the Euclidean space Rn is called compact if it is closed and bounded.
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3.1.2 Convergence of distributed algorithms to a fixed point
The iterative algorithm described by x := F(x) of dimension n can be trans-
formed into a distributed algorithm whose components can be computed
locally (at different times, if necessary) by suitably partitioning the system.2
Let the partition of x be x = (x1, . . . ,xQ) with xq ∈ R
nq and n1+· · ·+nQ = n
such that F = {Fq}
Q
q=1, with each Fq : Xq 7→ Xq such that X = X1×· · ·×XQ,
with each Xq ⊆ R
nq . According to this partition, the block-maximum norm
on Rn is defined as
‖F‖block = max
q
‖Fq‖q (3.1.3)
where ‖ · ‖q is any vector norm on R
nq for each q. The mapping F is called
a block-contraction with modulus α ∈ [0, 1) if it is a contraction in the
block-maximum norm with modulus α.
Thus, the distributed implementation of the iterative algorithm (3.1.1)
can be written as
xq = Fq(x), ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q. (3.1.4)
The fixed point of F, i.e., x∗ = F(x∗) is equivalent to computing the fixed
point of each component locally,
x∗q = Fq(x
∗), ∀ q = 1, . . . , Q. (3.1.5)
2Since the joint admissible strategy set of the games in this thesis is a Cartesian
product of the set of admissible strategies of each player, the results presented here
are limited to mappings whose domain can be written as a Cartesian product of
lower dimensional sets.
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Let xq(n) be the value of the qth component at time n. Let the discrete
set T ⊆ N+ = {1, 2, . . . } be the set of times at which one or more of the
components are updated and Tq be the set of time instants n when the
component xq(n) is updated. Further, the most recent values of the other
components may not be available during the computation of xi; thus, when
n ∈ Tq,
xq(n+ 1) = Fq
(
x1
(
τ q1 (n)
)
, . . . ,xq−1
(
τ qq−1(n)
)
,
xq+1
(
τ qq+1(n)
)
, . . . ,xQ
(
τ qQ(n)
))
,
(3.1.6)
where τ qr (n) is the time of the most recent value of component r available to
user q at time n.
Different update order and scheduling of the components of a distributed
algorithm lead to different classes of algorithms. The most common of these
are:
Jacobi scheme: All components (x1, . . . ,xQ) are updated simultaneously,
via the mapping F.
Gauss-Seidel scheme: All components (x1, . . . ,xQ) are updated sequen-
tially, one after the other, via the mapping F.
Totally asynchronous scheme: The components (x1, . . . ,xQ) are updated
fully asynchronously, i.e., in no particular order or even with the same
frequency, and the computation of some components may involve the
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use of outdated values of other components.3
The update order is of particular importance in the design of distributed
algorithms. The convergence properties of the same mapping may differ sig-
nificantly across different update schemes, possibly converging at different
rates, to different fixed-points or even not converging at all. The Gauss-
Seidel and Jacobi schemes are special cases of the totally asynchronous
scheme. The algorithm model described and characterized in this section
is totally asynchronous, which is the most general case of the classes de-
scribed above, and thus most useful to help characterize a larger class of
algorithms.
The following weak assumptions are made for each component q for the
system to be totally asynchronous:
1. The system is causal.
0 ≤ τ qr (n) ≤ n (3.1.7)
2. Out-dated information is eventually purged.
lim
k→∞
τ qr (nk) = +∞ (3.1.8)
3. No component fails to update its value eventually as time n progresses.
|T| =∞ (3.1.9)
3Variations of this scheme, such as having constraints on maximum tolerable
delay, leads to a class of partially asynchronous algorithms.
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These assumptions are generally satisfied in any practical implementa-
tion of distributed algorithms. The sufficient condition for convergence of
a totally asynchronous distributed algorithm as described in this section is
given in the following theorem [63]:
Theorem 3.2. Given the dynamic system in (3.1.1) with the mapping F =
{Fq}
Q
q=1 : X 7→ X with X = X1 × · · · × XQ, if the mapping F is a block-
contraction with modulus α ∈ [0, 1), then the totally asynchronous algorithm
based on the mapping F asymptotically converges to the unique fixed point
of F for any set of initial conditions in X and updating schedule.
3.2 Waterfilling: classical results — single-user systems
In this section, the core concepts in information theory which led to the
development of waterfilling as a solution to rate-maximization problems are
presented.
Many common communication channels are modelled as a Gaussian
channel, which is a time-discrete channel that models the noise at the re-
ceiver as an additive Gaussian random variable,
y = x+ n, n ∼ NC(0, σ
2), (3.2.1)
where x is the data transmitted in the current time-slot, y is the signal re-
ceived and n is the complex noise drawn from a circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian distribution of zero mean and variance σ2.
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If the average power constraint for transmission is P , then the capacity
of the Gaussian channel with noise variance σ2 is given by [64]
C =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2
)
nats/transmission. (3.2.2)
3.2.1 Parallel Gaussian channels
Now consider N independent Gaussian channels which transmit data in par-
allel with a common power constraint, P . This channel models a wideband
non-white additive Gaussian noise channel, where each parallel component
represents a different frequency. Let p , [p(1), . . . , p(N)] where p(k) is the
power allocated to the kth channel and σ2(k) be the variance of the additive
Gaussian noise in the kth channel. The goal is to allocate the power across
the different channels in order to maximize the overall information rate. The
solution to this rate-maximization problem, known as waterfilling, is given
by the following result [64]:
Proposition 3.1. The solution to the optimization problem
max
p
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
p(k)
σ2(k)
)
s. t. p(k) ≥ 0,
N∑
k=1
p(k) = P,
(3.2.3)
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Channel index 
 
Power allocated
1/Noise variance
Figure 3.1: A typical waterfilling solution for parallel Gaussian channels
showing the inverse noise variance levels and optimal power allocations
for each channel.
is given by
p∗(k) =
(
µ−
1
σ2(k)
)+
, (3.2.4)
where µ is chosen suitably to satisfy
∑N
k=1 p(k) = P , with (x)
+ , max(0, x).
A typical solution is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The reason for the term
“waterfilling” is evident from the figure. If the inverses of the noise variances
are assumed to be represented by the topography of the bottom of a vessel
and the total power to be allocated by a certain amount of water, then the
waterfilling solution indicates that the optimal power allocation across the
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channels is given by the depth of the water when the water is poured into
the vessel. The water level is reflected in the parameter µ.
3.2.2 MIMO Gaussian channel
The Gaussian channel model can be extended to describe single-user sys-
tems with multiple transmitter and/or receiver antennas. Let nT and nR be
the number of transmitter and receiver antennas respectively. The MIMO
Gaussian channel is given by
y = Hx+ n (3.2.5)
where y ∈ CnR×1 is the signal at the receiver, x ∈ CnT×1 is the transmitted
signal, H ∈ CnR×nT is the (nonsingular) channel matrix and n ∈ CnR×1 is
the receiver noise, which is assumed to be a zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian vector with the covariance matrix InR .
The observed information rate for this system is given by [64]
R = log det
(
InR +HQH
H
)
. (3.2.6)
where Q , E{xxH} is the covariance matrix of the transmitted signal. If
the total power available is P , the rate-maximizing power allocation is given
by the following result [65]:
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Proposition 3.2. The solution to the optimization problem
max
Q
log det
(
InR +HQH
H
)
s. t. Q  0,
Tr(Q) = P,
(3.2.7)
is given by
Q∗ = U
(
µI−D−1
)+
UH (3.2.8)
where U and D are calculated from the eigendecomposition
UDUH , HHH. (3.2.9)
Thus, for MIMO Gaussian channels, the optimal power allocation is to
perform waterfilling along “spatial modes” of the channels, as suggested by
its eigendecomposition.
3.3 Gaussian interference channel — multi-user systems
In an environment with multiple users, the previous two models break down.
This is because the channels of different users are no longer independent, and
transmission by one user causes interference to the others. Such a scenario
is modelled as a Gaussian interference channel (GIC). In this model, the
interference caused by other channels is modelled as an additive Gaussian
noise in addition to the usual receiver noise. When there are many paral-
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lel Gaussian interference channels, the resulting wideband system is called
a vector Gaussian interference channel. The vector Gaussian interference
channel could be frequency-flat or frequency-selective in nature.4
The capacity region of the Gaussian interference channel is an open
problem in information theory [64] and has been an area of active research
[66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. A myopic approach where each user independently and
simultaneously performs classical waterfilling [64] based only on its own chan-
nel state information (CSI) without taking the interference caused by other
users into account will be inefficient and unstable when the cross-channel
gains are not small enough that the interference caused is negligible. The
alternate approach of modelling the rate-maximization problem as a single
sum-rate maximization problem involving all the users and computed by a
centralized controller, leads to a non-convex optimization problem and has
been shown to be strongly NP–hard [22].
The focus in this thesis is on systems where the various users act with
minimal coordination, which precludes the use of multi-user coding/decoding
and interference-cancelation techniques. This is of interest because practical
systems have significant limitations on decoder complexity, signalling and
coordination among users. Under these constraints, multi-user interference
is treated as noise and the design of the transmission strategy reduces to
finding the optimum power allocation for each user. Due to the nature
4In this thesis, it is assumed that the various users in the vector Gaussian interfer-
ence channel (the frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel, in particular)
are single-antenna (SISO) systems, unless specifically stated.
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of competition and interdependent performance, game theory provides an
excellent set of tools to analyze this problem.
3.3.1 Competitive rate-maximization in the Gaussian interference
channel
Cooperative and noncooperative game theory have both been extensively ap-
plied to analyze power control problems in wireless networks [71,72,73,74,75].
Cooperative game-theoretic approaches to the problem of power control in
wireless networks have been surveyed in [76, 77, 78]. The distributed power
control problem for both single-channel and multi-channel wireless networks
has been characterized using supermodular game theory in [79, 80]. Coali-
tion, coordination and Nash bargaining theory for resource allocation in
interference channels have be investigated in [81,82,83,84,85,86].
In this thesis, the noncooperative scenario where the users are competing
against one another and aiming to maximize their own information rates is
considered. This approach transforms the centralized multi-objective opti-
mization problem into a set of mutually coupled competitive single-objective
optimization problems. This competitive rate-maximization problem can be
modelled as a strategic noncooperative game. The Nash equilibrium [42]
of this game can be achieved via a distributed waterfilling algorithm where
each user performs waterfilling by considering the multi-user interference as
an additive coloured noise.
The seminal work on competitive rate-maximization [24] has used a
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game-theoretic approach to design a decentralized algorithm for two-user
dynamic power control in a digital subscriber line (DSL) environment mod-
elled as a frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel. This work
has proposed a sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm for reaching the
Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner. A Nash equilibrium of the rate-
maximization game implies that given that the power allocations of other
users is constant, no user can further increase the achieved information rate
unilaterally. A vector power control problem for frequency-flat Gaussian in-
terference channels has been presented in [87]. The issue of multiple Nash
equilibria occurring in the presence of strong interference has been investi-
gated in [88]. Analysis of the sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm for an
arbitrary number of users using a linear complementary problem formulation
has been presented in [89]. Sufficient conditions for global convergence of an
asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm by formulating the waterfilling
function as a piecewise affine function have been presented in [90]. A matrix
game formulation for competitive rate-maximization in frequency-selective
Gaussian interference channels, along with a novel interpretation of the wa-
terfilling function as an Euclidian projection of a vector onto a convex set
have been presented in [91,92,93]. The convergence properties of the iterative
waterfilling algorithm to multiple Nash equilibria in flat-fading Gaussian in-
terference channels under different levels of interference and different update
strategies have been investigated in [94, 95, 96] and with sequential update
strategy in frequency-selective Gaussian interference channels in [97].
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An early work, [98], has looked into waterfilling algorithms for MIMO
interference systems, but without any analytical results on the existence of
an equilibrium and global convergence of the algorithm. The different ap-
proaches in [89, 90, 93] for the iterative waterfilling algorithm in frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channels have been unified under the formu-
lation of the waterfilling function as a Euclidean projection and extended
to MIMO Gaussian interference channels with square (nonsingular) chan-
nels in [63]. A complete characterization of the MIMO rate-maximization
game and the MIMO waterfilling algorithm for arbitrary channel matrices
has been investigated in [99]. This has been extended to the MIMO cognitive
radio scenario in [100].
The subsequent sections present an overview of the rate-maximization
game for frequency-selective and MIMO Gaussian interference channels,
along with the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium and convergence of the iterative waterfilling algorithm to
the equilibrium. The Euclidean projection interpretations of the respective
waterfilling functions are also presented as they are useful in the analysis of
the properties of the equilibrium.
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3.4 Iterative waterfilling for frequency-selective GICs
3.4.1 System model
Consider a Gaussian frequency-selective interference channel with N fre-
quencies, composed of Q SISO links. The quantity Hqr(k) denotes the fre-
quency response for the kth frequency bin of the channel between source r
and destination q. The variance of the zero-mean circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian noise at receiver q over the frequency bin k is denoted by σ2q (k).
The channel is assumed to be quasi-stationary for the duration of the trans-
mission. Each receiver is assumed to know the channel between itself and the
corresponding transmitter, but not other transmitters. Also, each receiver
is assumed to be able to measure, with no errors, the overall power spectral
density of the noise plus multi-user interference generated by other users.
Based on this information, each receiver computes the optimal power allo-
cation across the frequency bins for its own link and transmits it back to the
corresponding transmitter through a low bit-rate error-free feedback chan-
nel. Let the vector sq , [sq(1)sq(2) . . . sq(N)] be the N symbols transmitted
by user q on the N frequency bins and pq(k) , E
{
|sq(k)|
2
}
be the power
allocated to the kth frequency bin by user q and pq , [pq(1)pq(2) . . . pq(N)]
be the power allocation vector. The maximum achievable information rate
by user q is given by [64]
Rq =
1
N
N∑
k=1
log(1 + sinrq(k)), (3.4.1)
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where sinrq(k) is the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) on the
kth frequency bin of the qth user,
sinrq(k) ,
|Hqq(k)|
2pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2pr(k)
. (3.4.2)
3.4.2 Rate-maximization game
The problem of power allocation across the frequency bins is cast as strategic
noncooperative game with the SISO links as players and their information
rates as pay-off functions, under the following two constraints:
• Maximum total transmit power for each user:
E
{
‖sq‖
2
2
}
=
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ NPq, q = 1, . . . , Q, (3.4.3)
where Pq is power in units of energy per transmitted symbol.
• Spectral mask constraints:
E
{
|sq(k)|
2} = pq(k) ≤ pmaxq (k) (3.4.4)
for k = 1, . . . , N and q = 1, . . . , Q, where pmaxq (k) is the maximum
power that is allowed to be allocated by user q for the frequency bin
k.
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Mathematically, the game can be written as
(G S) :
max
pq
1
N
N∑
k=1
log(1 + sinrq(k))
s. t. pq ∈ Pq
∀q ∈ Ω (3.4.5)
where Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of the Q players (i.e. the SISO links) and
Pq is the set of admissible strategies of user q, which is defined as
Pq ,
{
pq ∈ R
N :
1
N
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = 1, 0 ≤ pq(k) ≤ p
max
q (k), k = 1, . . . , N
}
.
(3.4.6)
The inequality constraint in (4.2.1) is replaced with the equality constraint
as, at the optimum of each problem in (3.4.5), the constraint must be satisfied
with equality. To avoid the trivial solution pq(k) = p
max
q (k) ∀k, it is assumed
that
∑N
k=1 p
max
q > N . Further, the players can be limited to pure strategies
instead of mixed strategies, as shown in [91].
3.4.3 Nash equilibrium
The solution to the game G S is the Nash equilibrium. At any Nash equilib-
rium of this game, the optimum action profile of the players {p⋆q}q∈Ω must
satisfy the following set of nonlinear equations:
p⋆q = WF
S
q(p
⋆
1, . . . ,p
⋆
q−1,p
⋆
q+1, . . . ,p
⋆
Q) = WF
S
q(p
⋆
−q) ∀q ∈ Ω. (3.4.7)
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The waterfilling operator WFSq(·) is defined as [93]
[
WFSq(p−q)
]
k
,
[
µSq −
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|2
]pmaxq (k)
0
k = 1, . . . , N
(3.4.8)
where µSq is chosen to satisfy the power constraint
1
N
∑N
k=1 p
∗
q = 1.The Eu-
clidean projection [x]ba is defined as
[x]ba =

a if x ≤ a
x if a < x < b
b if x ≥ b
(3.4.9)
Waterfilling as a projection
The waterfilling function WFSq(·) can be equivalently represented as a Eu-
clidean projection. This is the key concept that allows the analytical study
of convergence of the iterative waterfilling-based algorithms.
Theorem 3.3. The waterfilling operation WFSq(·) in (3.4.8) can be equiva-
lently written as [92]
WFSq(p−q) = [− isnrq(p−q)]Pq , (3.4.10)
where
[isnrq(p−q)]k ,
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|2
. (3.4.11)
Section 3.4. Iterative waterfilling for frequency-selective GICs 70
Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
Let Dminq ⊆ {1, . . . , N} denote the set of frequency bins {1, . . . , N} from
which the frequency bins that user q would never use as the best response
set to any strategies adopted by the other users are removed [91]
Dminq ,
{
k ∈ {1, . . . , N} : ∃ p−q ∈ P−q such that
[
WFSq(p−q)
]
k
6= 0
}
(3.4.12)
where P−q , P1 × · · · × Pq−1 × Pq+1 × · · · × PQ. Given the game G
S , the
non-negative matrix Smax ∈ RQ×Q+ is defined as
[Smax]qr ,

max
k∈Dq∩Dr
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hqq(k)|2
Pr
Pq
, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise
(3.4.13)
The sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
of game G S is given by the following theorem [91]:
Theorem 3.4. Game G S has at least one Nash equilibrium for any set of
channel matrices and transmit powers of the users. Furthermore, the Nash
equilibrium is unique if
ρ(Smax) < 1 (3.4.14)
where Smax is defined in (3.4.13).
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3.4.4 Asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm
Let the discrete set T ⊆ N+ = 1, 2, . . . be the set of times at which one
or more users update their strategies. Let p
(n)
q denote the vector power
allocation of user q at the discrete time n, and let Tq ⊆ T represent the set
of time instants n when the power vector p
(n)
q of user q is updated. Let τ qr (n)
denote the time when the most recently perceived interference from user r
was computed by user q at time n (Note that 0 ≤ τ qr (n) ≤ n). Hence, if user
q updates his strategy at time n, then
p
(
τq(n)
)
−q ,
(
p
(
τq
1
(n)
)
1 , . . . ,p
(
τq
q−1
(n)
)
q−1 ,p
(
τq
q+1
(n)
)
q+1 , . . . ,p
(
τq
Q
(n)
)
Q
)
. (3.4.15)
The asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm (AIWFA) for comput-
ing the Nash equilibrium of game G S in a distributed fashion is described in
Algorithm 3.1. The convergence of Algorithm 3.1 is guaranteed under the
following sufficiency condition [93]:
Theorem 3.5. The asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm described
in Algorithm 3.1 converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of game G S as
T → ∞ for any set of feasible initial conditions if condition (3.4.14) is
satisfied.
The global convergence of the asynchronous iterative waterfilling algo-
rithm to the unique Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by Theorem 3.5 using
condition (3.4.13) despite game G S and the waterfilling operation WFSq(·)
being nonlinear.
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Algorithm 3.1 – Asynchronous Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Input:
Ω: Set of users in the system
Pq: Set of admissible strategies of user q
Tq: Set of time instants n when the power vector p
(n)
q of user q is
updated
T : Number of iterations for which the algorithm is run
τ qr (n): Time of the most recent power allocation of user r available
to user q at time n
WFSq(·): Waterfilling operation in (3.4.8)
Initialization: n = 0 and p(0)q ← any p ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω
for n = 0 to T do
p(n+1)q =
 WF
S
q
(
p
(τq(n))
−q
)
, if n ∈ Tq,
p(n)q , otherwise,
∀q ∈ Ω.
end for
3.5 Iterative waterfilling for MIMO GICs
3.5.1 System model
Consider a narrowband MIMO Gaussian interference channel composed of
Q MIMO links. The signal vector yq ∈ C
nRq×1 measured at the receiver of
user q is
yq = Hqqxq +
∑
r 6=q
Hrqxr + nq (3.5.1)
where Hrq ∈ C
nRq×nTr is the channel matrix between source r and des-
tination q, xq ∈ C
nTq×1 is the signal vector transmitted by source q and
nq ∈ C
nRq×1 is the receiver noise vector of user q, which is assumed to be a
zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector with an arbitrary
(nonsingular) covariance matrix Rnq . The second term in the right hand
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side of (3.5.1) is the multi-user interference observed at the destination q,
which is treated as additive spatially coloured Gaussian noise at the receiver
of user q. The channel is assumed to be quasi-stationary for the duration
of the transmission. At each receiver q, the channel matrix Hqq is assumed
to be known. Also, each receiver is assumed to be able to measure the co-
variance matrix of the noise plus multi-user interference generated by other
users. Based on this information, each destination q computes the optimal
covariance matricesQq , E{xqxq
H} for its own link and transmits it back to
its transmitter through a low bit-rate error-free feedback channel. This gives
the optimal transmitter beamformer for each of the users. The information
rate of user q, Rq(Qq,Q−q), for this system can be written as [63]
Rq(Qq,Q−q) = log det(I+H
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)HqqQq) (3.5.2)
where
R−q(Q−q) , Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
HrqQrH
H
rq (3.5.3)
is the interference plus noise covariance matrix observed by destination q,
and Q−q , {Qr}
Q
r 6=q is the set of covariance matrices of all users except the
qth user.
3.5.2 Rate-maximization game
Consider the system in (3.5.1) as a strategic noncooperative game with the
MIMO links as players and information rates of the respective links as payoff
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functions. Each player q competes rationally against other users in order to
maximize its own information rate Rq(Qq,Q−q) by designing the optimal
covariance matrix Q⋆q , given the constraint
E{‖xq‖
2
2} = Tr(Qq) ≤ Pq (3.5.4)
where Pq is the maximum average power transmitted in units of energy per
transmission. Mathematically, the game can be written as
(GM ) :
max
Qq
Rq(Qq,Q−q)
s. t. Qq ∈ Qq
∀q ∈ Ω (3.5.5)
where Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of theQ players (i.e. MIMO links), Rq(Qq,Q−q)
is the payoff function of player q as given in (3.5.2) and the set of admissible
strategies of player q, Qq, is defined as
Qq ,
{
Q ∈ CnTq×nTq : Q  0, Tr(Qq) = Pq
}
. (3.5.6)
The inequality constraint in (3.5.4) is replaced with the equality constraint
as, at the optimum of each problem in (3.5.5), the constraint must be satisfied
with equality [99]. Further, it can be proved that the players can be limited
to pure strategies instead of mixed strategies, as shown in [91].
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3.5.3 Nash equilibrium
The solution to the game GM is the Nash equilibrium. Given Q−q ∈ Q−q ,
Q1× · · · ×Qq−1×Qq+1× · · ·QQ at any Nash equilibrium of this game, the
optimum action profile of the players {Q⋆q}q∈Ω must satisfy
Q⋆q = WF
M
q (Q
⋆
1, . . . ,Q
⋆
q−1,Q
⋆
q+1, . . . ,Q
⋆
Q) = WF
M
q (Q
⋆
−q) ∀q ∈ Ω. (3.5.7)
The waterfilling operator WFMq (·) is defined as [99]
WFMq (Q−q) , Uq(µ
M
q I−D
−1
q )
+UHq (3.5.8)
where µMq is chosen to satisfy Tr
(
(µMq I−D
−1
q )
+
)
= Pq. The (semi)-unitary
matrix of eigenvectors Uq = Uq(Q−q) ∈ C
nTq×rq and the diagonal matrix
Dq = Dq(Q−q) ∈ R
rq×rq
++ with rq , rank(H
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq) = rank(Hqq)
positive eigenvalues are calculated from the eigendecomposition
HHqqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq , UqDqU
H
q . (3.5.9)
Waterfilling operation as a projection
The waterfilling operation WFMq (·) can be interpreted as a matrix projection
onto a convex set [92]. The projection expression depends on the nature of
the channel matrices Hqq, i.e. whether it is square and nonsingular or not.
Theorem 3.6. For the system in (3.5.1) with an arbitrary (possibly singu-
lar) set of channel matrices, the MIMO waterfilling operator WFMq (Q−q) in
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(3.5.8) can be equivalently written as [99]
WFMq (Q−q) =
[
−
(
(HHqqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq)
♯ + cqPN (Hqq)
)]
Qq
(3.5.10)
where cq ≥ cq(Q−q) , Pq +maxi∈1,...,rq
[
Dq(Q−q)
]−1
ii
is a positive constant.
The projection operator PN (A) is defined as
PN (A) , NA(NA
HNA)
−1NA
H (3.5.11)
where NA is any matrix whose columns span the null space of A given by
N (A).
Corollary 3.6.1. If the direct channel matrices Hqq are square and non-
singular for every user q, then the MIMO waterfilling operator WFMq (Q−q)
in (3.5.8) can be equivalently written as [63]
WFMq (Q−q) =
[
−
(
HHqqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq
)−1]
Qq
(3.5.12)
In this case, Uq becomes a unitary matrix and Dq will be of dimension
nTq × nTq with nTq eigenvalues as the matrix Hqq will be a full-column rank
matrix with rq = rank(Hqq) = nTq . It can easily be verified that the result
in (3.5.12) is a special case of (3.5.10), as PN (Hqq) = 0 when the channel
matrices Hqq are square and nonsingular, and thus full column-rank.
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Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
Given the MIMO system in (3.5.1), the non-negative matrices S ∈ RQ×Q+
and Sup ∈ RQ×Q+ are defined as
[S]qr ,

ρ
(
HHrqH
♯H
qq H
♯
qqHrq
)
, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise
(3.5.13)
and
[Sup]qr ,

innrq ·ρ(H
H
rqHrq)ρ(H
♯H
qq H
♯
qq), if r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(3.5.14)
where innrq is the interference-plus-noise to noise ratio and is defined as [99]
innrq ,
ρ
(
Rnq +
∑
r 6=q PrHrqHrq
H
)
λmin(Rnq)
≥ 1, ∀q ∈ Ω. (3.5.15)
Given Sup and S, the matrix S
up
∈ RQ×Q+ is defined as
[S
up
]qr ,

[S]qr, if rank(Hqq) = nRq ,
[Sup]qr, otherwise,
(3.5.16)
The sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium of game GM is given by the following theorem [99]:
Theorem 3.7. Game GM has at least one Nash equilibrium for any set of
channel matrices and transmit powers of the users. Furthermore, the Nash
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equilibrium is unique if
ρ(S
up
) < 1 (3.5.17)
where S
up
is defined in (3.5.16)
Corollary 3.7.1. If the direct channel matrices Hqq are square and non-
singular for every user q, then the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium of game GM is [63]
ρ(S) < 1 (3.5.18)
where S is defined as
[S]qr ,

ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
−1
qq Hrq
)
, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise.
(3.5.19)
3.5.4 MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm
Let the discrete set T ⊆ N+ = 1, 2, . . . be the set of times at which one or
more users update their strategies. Let Q
(n)
q denote the covariance matrix
of user q at the discrete time n, and let Tq ⊆ T denote the set of time
instants n when the covariance matrix Q
(n)
q of user q is updated. Let τ qr (n)
denote the time when the most recently perceived interference from user r
was computed by user q at time n (Note that 0 ≤ τ qr (n) ≤ n). Hence, if user
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Algorithm 3.2 – MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Input:
Ω: Set of users in the system
Qq: Set of admissible strategies of user q
Tq: Set of time instants n when the covariance matrix Q
(n)
q of user q
is updated
T : Number of iterations for which the algorithm is run
τ qr (n): Time of the most recent power allocation of user r available
to user q at time n
WFMq (·): Waterfilling operation in (3.5.8)
Initialization: n = 0 and Q(0)q ← any Q ∈ Qq, ∀q ∈ Ω
for n = 0 to T do
Q(n+1)q =

WFMq
(
Q
(τq(n))
−q
)
, if(n) ∈ Tq,
Q(n)q , otherwise
∀q ∈ Ω,
end for
q updates his strategy at time n, then
Q
(
τq(n)
)
−q ,
(
Q
(
τq
1
(n)
)
1 , . . . ,Q
(
τq
q−1
(n)
)
q−1 ,Q
(
τq
q+1
(n)
)
q+1 , . . . ,Q
(
τq
Q
(n)
)
Q
)
. (3.5.20)
The MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm (MIWFA) for computing the
Nash equilibrium of game GM in a distributed fashion is described in Al-
gorithm 3.2. The convergence of Algorithm 3.2 is guaranteed under the
following sufficiency condition [99]:
Theorem 3.8. The MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm, described in Al-
gorithm 3.2 converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of game GM as T →∞
for any set of feasible initial conditions if condition (3.5.17) is satisfied.
The global convergence of the MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm to
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the unique Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by Theorem 3.8 using condition
(3.5.17) despite game GM and the waterfilling operation WFMq (·) being non-
linear and is valid for arbitrary channel matrices, either tall/fat or singular.
3.6 Iterative waterfilling for broadband MIMO GICs
The previous section introduced the MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm
for narrowband systems. Here, this framework is extended to broadband
(OFDM) systems, limited to systems with square (nonsingular) direct chan-
nel matrices. The challenge in such a scenario is that the power allocation
has to be performed across both frequency and space (viz. transmit an-
tennas). This is achieved by modifying the constraints in the waterfilling
expression so that power allocation is optimal in both space and frequency.
The spatial optimality is essentially designing the optimal beamformer and
the spectral optimality is the magnitude of power spectral density at each
frequency bin.
3.6.1 System model
Consider a broadband MIMO Gaussian interference channel with N fre-
quencies composed of Q MIMO links. At any frequency f , the signal vector
yfq ∈ C
nRq×1 measured at the receiver of user q is
yfq = H
f
qqx
f
q +
∑
r 6=q
Hfrqx
f
r + n
f
q , (3.6.1)
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where Hfrq ∈ C
nRq×nTr is the channel matrix between source r and destina-
tion q, xfq ∈ C
nTq×1 is the vector transmitted by source q and nfq ∈ C
nRq×1
is the receiver noise of user q, which is a zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian vector with an arbitrary (nonsingular) covariance matrix
Rfnq . The second term in the right hand side of (3.6.1) is the multi-user inter-
ference observed at the destination q, which is treated as additive spatially
coloured noise. The channel is assumed to be stationary for the duration of
the transmission. At each receiver q, the channel matrix Hfqq is assumed to
be known. Note that there are no constraints on the dimensions or rank of
the channel matrices. Also, each receiver is assumed to be able to measure
the covariance matrix of the noise plus multi-user interference generated by
other users. The covariance matrix of the noise plus multi-user interference
observed by destination q at frequency f is given by
R
f
−q , R
f
nq
+
∑
r 6=q
HfrqQ
f
rH
f
rq
H
. (3.6.2)
Based on this information, each destination q computes the optimal covari-
ance matrices Qfq , E{x
f
qx
f
q
H
} for each frequency f for its own link and
informs its transmitter through a low bit-rate error-free feedback channel.
Let Q̂q and R̂nq be the set of the transmitter covariance matrices and
noise covariance of player q for the N frequency bins written in block-
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diagonal form respectively,
Q̂q , Diag
(
Q1q , . . . ,Q
N
q
)
=

Q1q 0
. . .
0 QNq
 , (3.6.3)
and
R̂nq , Diag
(
R1nq , . . . ,R
N
nq
)
=

R1nq 0
. . .
0 RNnq
 . (3.6.4)
The channel matrices and the noise plus multi-user interference covariance
matrices can be written in block-diagonal form respectively as
Ĥrq , Diag
(
H1rq, . . . ,H
N
rq
)
=

H1rq 0
. . .
0 HNrq
 , (3.6.5)
and
R̂−q , Diag
(
R1−q, . . . ,R
N
−q
)
=

R1−q 0
. . .
0 RN−q
 . (3.6.6)
The information rate achieved by user q over all frequency bins is given by
Rq(Q̂q, Q̂−q) = log det(I+ Ĥ
H
qqR̂
−1
−qĤqqQ̂q). (3.6.7)
Each player q competes rationally against other users in order to maximize
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its own information rate Rq(Q̂q, Q̂−q) by designing the optimal covariance
matrix Q̂⋆q , given the constraint
E
{ N∑
f=1
‖xfq ‖
2
2
}
=
N∑
f=1
Tr(Qfq ) = Tr(Q̂q) ≤ Pq, (3.6.8)
where Pq is the maximum average power transmitted in units of energy per
transmission.
3.6.2 Rate-maximization game
The game can be cast in mathematical form as
(GBM ) :
max
Q̂q
Rq(Q̂q, Q̂−q)
s. t. Q̂q ∈ Q̂q,
∀q ∈ Ω, (3.6.9)
where Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of theQ players (i.e. MIMO links), Rq(Q̂q, Q̂−q)
is the payoff function of player q as given in (3.6.7) and the set of admissible
strategies of player q, Q̂q, is defined as
Q̂q ,
{
Q̂ :
N∑
f=1
Tr(Qfq ) = Pq; Q
f
q ∈ C
nTq×nTq ,
Qfq  0 ∀f = 1, . . . , N
}
.
(3.6.10)
This game can now be solved using the MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm
[99] as the new matrices Q̂q, R̂−q and Ĥrq satisfy the necessary conditions
and assumptions.
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Figure 3.2: System with 3 MIMO links and 4 frequencies. θqr is the
electrical angle of the signal observed at destination r from source q.
3.6.3 Numerical results
To confirm the operation of the algorithm in a broadband setup, a broad-
band system having 3 MIMO links and 4 frequencies is considered. In order
to show the coherence of the beamformer direction across frequencies, the
signal received at destination r from source q is assumed to be at an elec-
trical angle θqr + ǫ, where ǫ is a small Gaussian random variable that varies
across different frequencies. The sources have 6, 5 and 3 antennas and their
corresponding destinations have 4, 7 and 4 antennas respectively placed as a
uniform linear array as shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3a shows the informa-
tion rate achieved by each user against iteration index for the system shown
in Figure 3.2, with θ11 = 5π/6, θ12 = π/6, θ13 = π/4, θ21 = −π/6, θ22 =
7π/6, θ23 = −π/4, θ31 = 2π/3, θ32 = 5π/6 and θ33 = π/3. As seen in the
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figure, the broadband MIMO waterfilling algorithm has very fast conver-
gence as expected from [99]. The information rates of the users reach their
equilibrium values with 2-3 iterations.
Figure 3.3b shows the plot of the beamforming patterns associated with
the dominant eigenvalues of the optimal covariance matrices computed using
the broadband MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm for the above setup.
The major lobes are in the direction of the appropriate receiver at all fre-
quencies for both users. There are no side lobes as the system considered
does not have multipath propagation. The fast convergence and appropriate
beamformer directions have been observed for many channel realizations and
different number of users and frequencies.
3.7 Effect of CSI estimation errors
In this section, the effect of errors in the CSI on the Nash equilibrium of the
MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm is investigated. The MIMO iterative
waterfilling algorithm [99] assumes that the direct channel matrices Hqq can
be estimated accurately, which is not possible in practical systems. The
estimate of the direct channel matrices in the presence of errors, H˜qq, can
be written as
H˜qq = Hqq +Nq, (3.7.1)
where Nq is a nRq × nTq matrix with zero mean complex Gaussian random
elements of variance σ2. The optimal covariance matrices {Q˜∗q}q∈Ω are com-
puted based on the channel matrices H˜qq using the waterfilling algorithm
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Figure 3.3: System with two links with 4 antennas each and θ11 =
5π/6, θ12 = π/6, θ13 = π/4, θ21 = −π/6, θ22 = 7π/6, θ23 = −π/4, θ31 =
2π/3, θ32 = 5π/6 and θ33 = π/3.
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Figure 3.4: Histograms of total information rates achieved using the
MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm (a) in the absence of CSI esti-
mation errors and (b) in the presence of CSI estimation errors. It can
be seen that the information rate achieved by the algorithm is reduced
in the presence of CSI estimation errors.
and the total information rate achieved by all users with these covariance
matrices is compared with the total information rates that would have been
achieved in the absence of CSI estimation errors.
Consider a two user case, each with 4 receive and 4 transmit antennas.
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The elements of the channel matrices Hqr are complex Gaussian random
variables of unit variance and σ = 0.5. This setup is run for 100,000 dif-
ferent channel realizations. The histograms of the total information rates
achieved in the absence and presence of CSI estimation errors are presented
in Figures 3.4a and 3.4b respectively. It is clear that CSI estimation errors
have a significant effect on the performance of the MIMO iterative water-
filling algorithm. The average loss in performance is about 7.45%. This
indicates the necessity for the study of the robust distributed algorithms for
optimal power allocation in the presence of CSI errors.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, the conceptual and mathematical foundations from different
areas needed for the techniques proposed in this thesis were summarized.
This included results from contraction and fixed point theory, information
theory (Gaussian channels and waterfilling) and the main game-theoretic ap-
proach to competitive rate-maximization in Gaussian interference channels.
A brief investigation into the effect of channel state information errors on
the performance of the MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm was also pre-
sented, setting the scene for the robust solutions proposed in the subsequent
chapters.
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Appendix 3.A KKT Conditions
A convex optimization problem can be defined in the standard form as
min
x
f0(x)
s. t. fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.A.1)
hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p,
where the vector x ∈ Rn is the optimization variable of the problem, the
functions f0, · · · , fm are convex functions and the functions h1, · · · , hp are
linear functions. The function f0 is the objective function or cost function.
The inequalities fi(x) ≤ 0 are called the inequality constraints and equalities
hi(x) = 0 are called the equality constraints. If there are no constraints,
then the problem is said to be an unconstrained problem. The domain of
the optimization problem (3.A.1) is the set of points for which the objective
and the constraints are defined and is denoted as
D =
m⋂
i=0
domfi ∩
p⋂
i=0
domhi. (3.A.2)
A point x ∈ D is feasible, if it satisfies all the constraints fi(x) ≤ 0 i =
1, · · · ,m and hi(x) = 0 i = 1, · · · , p. Problem (3.A.1) is said to be feasible
if at least one feasible point exists and is infeasible otherwise. The optimal
value or the solution of the optimization problem is achieved at the optimal
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point x⋆ if and only if
f0(x
⋆) ≤ f0(x) ∀x ∈ D. (3.A.3)
The Lagrangian L : Rn×Rm×Rp 7→ R for the original problem in (3.A.1)
can be defined as [51]
L(x,λ,ν) = f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
νihi(x), (3.A.4)
where λi and νi are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the ith inequal-
ity constraint fi(x) ≤ 0 and equality constraint hi(x) = 0 respectively. The
objective f0(x) in (3.A.1) is called the primal objective and the optimiza-
tion variable x is termed the primal variable. Lagrange multipliers λ and ν
associated with the problem (3.A.4) are called the dual variables.
The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (also known as the Kuhn–Tucker
or KKT conditions) are given by [51]:
1. Primal feasibility:
fi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (3.A.5)
hi(x) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , p. (3.A.6)
2. Dual feasibility:
λi ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (3.A.7)
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3. Complementary slackness:
λifi(x) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (3.A.8)
4. Stationarity:
∇f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇fi(x) +
p∑
i=1
νi∇hi(x) = 0. (3.A.9)
The KKT conditions are necessary conditions for optimality in general but
not sufficient conditions.
Chapter 4
ROBUST IWFA FOR SISO
FREQUENCY-SELECTIVE
SYSTEMS
In the previous chapter, the rate-maximization games for frequency-selective
and MIMO Gaussian interference channels were introduced and the adverse
effect of uncertainty in channel state information on the performance of
these games was demonstrated. The results therein indicate that there is a
necessity for the development of robust rate-maximization games that can
perform well under channel state information uncertainty. In this chapter, an
analytical framework for the robust rate-maximization game for a frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channel is developed and characterized.
The chapter begins with a discussion of other work in the literature which
has addressed the channel uncertainty issue in rate-maximization games.
This is followed by the introduction of a distribution-free robust frame-
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work for rate-maximization games under bounded channel uncertainty. The
closed-form equilibrium solution of this game is then derived, followed by
analytical proofs for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. An asyn-
chronous iterative algorithm to compute the equilibrium is then proposed.
Finally, simulation results to demonstrate the behaviour of the algorithm
are presented.
4.1 Related work
Uncertainty in game-theoretic and distributed-optimization problems in wire-
less communications has only recently been investigated. The issue of bounded
uncertainty in specific distributed optimization problems in communication
networks has been investigated in [101] wherein techniques to define the
uncertainty set such that they can be solved distributively by robust opti-
mization techniques are presented.
A robust optimization approach for the rate-maximization game with
uncertainty in the noise-plus-interference estimate has been briefly investi-
gated in [102], where the authors present a numerically computed algorithm
unlike the closed form results presented in this chapter. Such a numerical
solution prevents further mathematical analysis of the equilibrium and its
behaviour under different uncertainty bounds. Also, this uncertainty model
is different from the one adopted in this work, where the availability of CSI
of the interfering channels with bounded uncertainty is assumed.
A similar problem of rate-maximization in the presence of uncertainty in
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the estimate of noise-plus-interference levels due to quantization in the feed-
back channel has been considered in [103]. This problem has been solved
using a probabilistically constrained optimization approach and as in the
work presented in this chapter, also results in the waterfilling solution mov-
ing closer to an FDMA solution, with corresponding improvement in sum-
rate. However, the effect of quantization on the conditions for existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence of the algorithm have not
been considered. The results presented in [103] are for a sequentially up-
dated algorithm whereas the results of this chapter allow asynchronous (and
thus sequential or simultaneous) updates to the algorithm. Also, the power
allocations computed by such a probabilistic optimization formulation do
not guarantee that the information rates expected will be achieved for all
channel realizations, unlike the worst-case optimization formulation in this
chapter. Furthermore, the relative error (and not just the absolute error due
to quantization) in the interference estimate as defined in [103] is assumed to
be bounded and drawn from a uniform distribution, which is inaccurate. In
addition, this bound on the relative error can only be computed if the noise
variance at the receivers is assumed to be known (which is not the case). The
bounds computed in such a fashion are very loose and will degrade system
performance. The other assumption that this relative error bound is in the
range [0, 1) means that the absolute quantization error has to be less than
the noise variance at the receivers, which restricts the applicability of the
approach. The problem formulation in this chapter has no such limitation
Section 4.2. System model 95
on the uncertainty bound based on the noise variances in the system.
Dynamic robust games for MIMO systems, where a learning framework
is used to develop suitable power allocations in repeated games with chan-
nel uncertainty and delayed imperfect payoffs (information rate), have been
recently proposed in [104]. A robust rate-maximization game for a cogni-
tive radio scenario with uncertainty in the channel to the primary user has
been presented in [105]. This leads to a noncooperative game formulation
without any uncertainties in the payoff functions of the game (unlike the
game formulation in this chapter) with robust interference limits acting as
a constraint on the admissible set of strategies. This game is then solved
using numerical techniques as there is no closed form solution.
4.2 System model
Consider a system similar to the one in [93], which is a SISO frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channel with N frequencies, composed of
Q SISO links. Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of the Q players (i.e. SISO
links). The quantity Hrq(k) denotes the complex frequency response of
the k-th frequency bin of the channel between source r and destination
q. The variance of the zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
noise at receiver q in the frequency bin k is denoted by σ¯2q (k). The chan-
nel is assumed to be quasi-stationary for the duration of the transmission.
Let σ2q (k) , σ¯
2
q (k)/|Hqq(k)|
2 and the total transmit power of user q be Pq.
Let the vector sq , [sq(1) sq(2) . . . sq(N)] be the N symbols transmitted
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by user q on the N frequency bins and pq(k) , E{|sq(k)|
2} be the power
allocated to the k-th frequency bin by user q and pq , [pq(1) pq(2) . . . pq(N)]
be the power allocation vector. The power allocation of each user q has two
constraints:
• Maximum total transmit power for each user
E
{
‖sq‖
2
2
}
=
N∑
k=1
pq(k) ≤ Pq, (4.2.1)
for q = 1, . . . , Q, where Pq is power in units of energy per transmitted
symbol.
• Spectral mask constraints
E
{
|sq(k)|
2} = pq(k) ≤ pmaxq (k), (4.2.2)
for k = 1, . . . , N and q = 1, . . . , Q, where pmaxq (k) is the maximum
power that is allowed to be allocated by user q for the frequency bin
k.
Each receiver estimates the channel between itself and all the transmit-
ters, which is private information. The power allocation vectors are public
information, i.e. known to all users. Each receiver computes the optimal
power allocation across the frequency bins for its own link and transmits it
back to the corresponding transmitter in a low bit-rate error-free feedback
channel. Note that this leads to sharing of more information compared to
other work in the literature such as [93]. The channel state information
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estimated by each receiver is assumed to have a bounded uncertainty of un-
known distribution. An ellipsoid is often used to approximate complicated
convex uncertainty sets [51]. The ellipsoidal approximation has the advan-
tage of parametrically modelling complicated data sets and thus provides a
convenient input parameter to algorithms. Further, in certain cases there
are statistical reasons leading to ellipsoidal uncertainty sets and also results
in optimization problems with convenient analytical structures [60, 106].
At each frequency, the uncertainty in the channel state information of
each user is deterministically modelled under an ellipsoidal approximation1
Fq =
{
Frq(k) + ∆Frq,k :
∑
r 6=q
|∆Frq,k|
2 ≤ ǫ2q ∀k = 1, . . . , N
}
, (4.2.3)
where ǫq ≥ 0 ∀ q ∈ Ω is the uncertainty bound and
Frq(k) ,
|Hrq(k)|
2
|Hqq(k)|2
, (4.2.4)
with Frq(k) being the nominal value. It is possible to consider uncertainty
in Frq(k) instead of Hrq(k) because bounded uncertainties in Frq(k) and
Hrq(k) are equivalent, but with different bounds.
2
1More specifically, the uncertainty set in (4.2.3) is a spherical approximation.
2The model considered here has some redundancy in the uncertainty for the case
when Frq(k) = 0 which leads to including Frq(k) + ∆Frq,k < 0 in the model which
can never happen in practice. However, this does not affect the solution in this
method due to the nature of the max-min problem formulation in (4.3.3) which
leads to selection of positive values of ∆Frq,k.
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The nominal information rate of user q can be written as [64]
Rq =
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q Frq(k)pr(k)
)
, (4.2.5)
where σ2q (k) , σ¯
2
q (k)/|Hqq(k)|
2.
A robust rate-maximization game is formulated and analyzed based on
this system model in the subsequent sections of this chapter and in Chapter 5.
4.3 Robust rate-maximization game formulation
According to the robust game model presented in Section 2.5 on page 47,
each player formulates a best response as the solution of a robust (worst-case)
optimization problem for the uncertainty in the payoff function (information
rate), given the other players’ strategies. If all the players know that everyone
else is using the robust optimization approach to the payoff uncertainty, they
would then be able to mutually predict each other’s behaviour. The robust
game G Srob where each player q formulates a worst-case robust optimization
problem can be written as, ∀ q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
min
F˜rq∈Fq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
F˜rq(k)pr(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq,
(4.3.1)
where Fq is the uncertainty set which is modelled under ellipsoid approxi-
mation as shown in (4.2.3), Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of the Q players (i.e.
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the SISO links) and Pq is the set of admissible strategies of user q, which is
defined as
Pq ,
{
pq ∈ R
N :
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = Pq, 0 ≤ pq(k) ≤ p
max
q (k), k = 1, . . . , N
}
.
(4.3.2)
This optimization problem using uncertainty sets can be equivalently written
in a form represented by protection functions [101] as, ∀q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
min
∆Frq,k
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
(Frq(k) + ∆Frq,k)pr(k)
)
s. t.
∑
r 6=q
|∆Frq,k|
2 ≤ ǫ2q , k = 1, ...N
pq ∈ Pq.
(4.3.3)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [107], ∀k = 1, . . . , N ,
∑
r 6=q
∆Frq,kpr(k) ≤
[∑
r 6=q
|∆Frq,k|
2
∑
r 6=q
|pr(k)|
2
] 1
2
(4.3.4)
≤ ǫq
√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(k) (4.3.5)
Using (4.3.5), the robust game can be formulated as, ∀q ∈ Ω,
(G Srob) :
max
pq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k) + ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq.
(4.3.6)
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Having defined the problem for robust rate-maximization under bounded
channel uncertainty, the solution to the optimization problem in (4.3.6) for
a single-user is presented in the following section.
4.4 Robust waterfilling solution
The closed-form solution to the robust optimization problem in (4.3.6) for
any particular user q is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Given the set of power allocations of other users p−q ,
{p1, . . . ,pq−1,pq+1, . . . ,pQ}, the solution to the robust optimization problem
of user q,
max
pq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1+
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k)+ ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq. (4.4.1)
is given by the waterfilling solution
p⋆q = RWF
S
q(p−q), (4.4.2)
where the waterfilling operator RWFSq(·) is defined for k = 1, . . . , N, as
[
RWFSq(p−q)
]
k
,
[
µq − σ
2
q (k)−
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k)− ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
]pmaxq (k)
0
(4.4.3)
where µq is chosen to satisfy the power constraint
∑N
k=1 p
⋆
q(k) = 1.
Section 4.4. Robust waterfilling solution 101
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
The robust waterfilling operation for each user is a distributed worst-
case optimization under bounded channel uncertainty. Compared with the
original waterfilling operation in [93] under perfect CSI (i.e. ǫq ≡ 0), it can
be seen that an additional term has appeared in (4.4.3) for ǫq > 0.
This additional term can be interpreted as a penalty for allocating power
to frequencies having a large product of uncertainty bound and norm of the
powers of the other players currently transmitting in those frequencies. This
is because the users assume the worst-case interference from other users and
are thus conservative about allocating power to such channels where there
is a strong presence of other users.
4.4.1 Robust waterfilling as a projection operation
Let Φq(k) represent the denominator terms in (4.4.1), which is the worst-case
noise-plus-interference
Φq(k) , σ
2
q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k) + ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k). (4.4.4)
It has been shown in [92] that the waterfilling operation can be interpreted as
the Euclidean projection of a vector onto a simplex. Using this framework,
the robust waterfilling operator in (4.4.3) can be expressed as the Euclidean
projection of the vector Φq , [Φq(1), . . . ,Φq(N)]
T onto the simplex Pq de-
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fined in (4.3.2):
RWFSq(p−q) =
[
−Φq
]
Pq
, (4.4.5)
which can be conveniently written as
RWFSq(p−q) =
[
− σq −
∑
r 6=q
Frqpr − ǫqfq
]
Pq
, (4.4.6)
where
σq ,
[
σ2q (1), . . . , σ
2
q (N)
]T
, (4.4.7)
Frq , Diag
(
Frq(1), . . . , Frq(N)
)
, (4.4.8)
fq ,
[√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(1) , . . . ,
√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(N)
]T
. (4.4.9)
Let N = {1, . . . , N} be the set of frequency bins. Let D◦q denote the set
of frequency bins that user q would never use as the best response to any
set of strategies adopted by the other users,
D◦q ,
{
k ∈ {1, . . . , N} :
[
RWFSq(p−q)
]
k
= 0 ∀p−q ∈ P−q
}
(4.4.10)
where P−q , P1× · · · ×Pq−1×Pq+1× · · · ×PQ. The non-negative matrices
E and Smax ∈ RQ×Q+ are defined as
[E]qr ,

ǫq, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(4.4.11)
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and
[Smax]qr ,

max
k∈Dq∩Dr
Frq(k), if r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(4.4.12)
where Dq is any subset of {1, . . . , N} such that N −D
◦
q ⊆ Dq ⊆ {1, . . . , N}.
Contraction property of the waterfilling projection
The contraction property of the waterfilling mapping is given by the following
lemma:
Lemma 4.1. Given w , [w1, . . . , wQ]
T > 0, the mapping RWFS(·) defined
in (4.B.1) satisfies
∥∥RWFS (p(1))−RWFS (p(2))∥∥w
2,block
≤ ||Smax+E||w∞,mat×
∥∥p(1)−p(2)∥∥w
2,block
,
(4.4.13)
∀p(1),p(2) ∈ P, E and S as defined in (4.4.11) and (4.4.12) respectively.
Furthermore, if
||Smax +E||w∞,mat < 1, (4.4.14)
for some w > 0, then the mapping RWFS(·) is a block contraction with
modulus α = ||Smax +E||w∞,mat.
Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
Having derived and characterized the robust waterfilling solution in the
presence of channel uncertainty, the issue of whether a stable equilibrium for
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the system exists is to be considered. If so, its properties and computation
are to be considered. This is undertaken in the subsequent sections.
4.5 Robust-optimization equilibrium
The solution to the game G Srob is the robust-optimization equilibrium. At any
robust-optimization equilibrium of this game, the optimum action profile of
the players {p⋆q}q∈Ω must satisfy the following set of simultaneous waterfilling
equations: ∀q ∈ Ω,
p⋆q = RWF
S
q(p
⋆
1, . . . ,p
⋆
q−1,p
⋆
q+1, . . . ,p
⋆
Q) = RWF
S
q(p
⋆
−q). (4.5.1)
It can easily be verified that the robust-optimization equilibrium reduces
to the Nash equilibrium of the system [93] when there is no uncertainty in
the system. In Chapter 5, the global efficiency of the robust-optimization
equilibrium for the two-user case is analyzed and it is shown that the robust-
optimization equilibrium has a higher efficiency than the Nash equilibrium
due to a penalty for interference which encourages better partitioning of the
frequency space among the users.
4.5.1 Analysis of the equilibrium of game G Srob
The contraction property of the waterfilling mapping is useful in the analysis
of the equilibrium of game G Srob. A sufficient condition for existence and
uniqueness of the robust-optimization equilibrium of game G Srob is given by
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the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2. Game G Srob has at least one equilibrium for any set of channel
values and transmit powers of the users. Furthermore, the equilibrium is
unique if
ρ(Smax) < 1− ρ(E), (4.5.2)
where E and S are as defined in (4.4.11) and (4.4.12) respectively.
Proof. See Appendix 4.C.
In the absence of uncertainty, i.e. when ǫq = 0 ∀q ∈ Ω, this condition
reduces to condition (C1) in [93] as expected. Since ρ(E) ≥ 0, the condition
on Smax becomes more stringent as the uncertainty bound increases, i.e. the
set of channel coefficients for which the existence of a unique equilibrium is
guaranteed shrinks as the uncertainty bound increases.
4.6 Iterative algorithm for robust waterfilling
In this section, an iterative waterfilling algorithm, based on the framework
presented in Section 3.1.2, for computing the robust-optimization equilib-
rium is presented.
Let the discrete set T ⊆ N+ = {1, 2, . . . } be the set of times at which one
or more users update their strategies and T be the number of iterations for
which the algorithm is run. Let p
(n)
q denote the vector power allocation of
user q at the discrete time n, and let Tq ⊆ T denote the set of time instants
n when the power vector p
(n)
q of user q is updated. Let τ qr (n) denote the time
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Algorithm 4.1 – Robust SISO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Input:
Ω: Set of users in the system
Pq: Set of admissible strategies of user q
Tq: Set of time instants n when the power vector p
(n)
q of user q is
updated
T : Number of iterations for which the algorithm is run
τ qr (n): Time of the most recent power allocation of user r available
to user q at time n
RWFSq(·): Robust waterfilling operation in (4.4.3)
Initialization: n = 0 and p(0)q ← any p ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω
for n = 0 to T do
p(n+1)q =
 RWF
S
q
(
p
(τq(n))
−q
)
, if n ∈ Tq,
p(n)q , otherwise,
∀q ∈ Ω.
end for
of the most recent power allocation information of user r which is available
to user q at time n (Note that 0 ≤ τ qr (n) ≤ n). Hence, if the strategy of user
q is updated at time n, then
p
(
τq(n)
)
−q ,
(
p
(
τq
1
(n)
)
1 , . . . ,p
(
τq
q−1
(n)
)
q−1 ,p
(
τq
q+1
(n)
)
q+1 , . . . ,p
(
τq
Q
(n)
)
Q
)
. (4.6.1)
The robust asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm for computing
the equilibrium of game G Srob in a distributed fashion is described in Al-
gorithm 4.1. The convergence of Algorithm 4.1 is guaranteed under the
following sufficiency condition:
Theorem 4.3. The asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm described
in Algorithm 4.1 converges to the unique robust-optimization equilibrium of
Section 4.6. Iterative algorithm for robust waterfilling 107
game G Srob as the number of iterations for which the algorithm is run, T →∞
for any set of feasible initial conditions if condition (4.5.2) is satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix 4.D.
The global convergence of the distributed robust iterative waterfilling
algorithm to the unique robust-optimization equilibrium is guaranteed by
Theorem 4.3 using condition (4.5.2) despite game G Srob and the waterfilling
operation RWFSq(·) being nonlinear. Also, from Lemma 4.1, the modulus of
the waterfilling contraction increases as uncertainty increases. This indicates
that the convergence of the iterative waterfilling algorithm becomes slower
as the uncertainty increases, as seen in the simulation results in Section 4.7.
Also, the set of channel coefficients for which convergence of the algorithm
is guaranteed reduces as the uncertainty bound increases.
Corollary 4.3.1. When the uncertainties of all the Q users are equal (say
ǫ), the robust-optimization equilibrium of game G Srob is unique and Algo-
rithm 4.1 converges to the unique robust-optimization equilibrium of game
G Srob as T →∞ for any set of feasible initial conditions if
ρ(Smax) < 1− ǫ(Q− 1) (4.6.2)
Proof. When the uncertainties of all Q users is ǫ, ρ(E) = ǫ(Q− 1).
The above corollary explicitly shows how the uncertainty bound and the
number of users in the system affect the existence of the equilibrium and the
convergence to the equilibrium using an iterative waterfilling algorithm. For
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a fixed uncertainty bound, as the number of users in the system increases,
there is a larger amount of uncertain information in the system. Hence, the
probability that a given system for a fixed uncertainty bound will converge
will decrease as the number of users in the system increases. Also, if ǫ(Q−
1) ≥ 1, a unique equilibrium for non-zero uncertainty bounds cannot be
guaranteed regardless of the channel coefficients. This will help determine
the number of users that could be allowed to operate in the system based
on the uncertainty bounds.
The modified waterfilling operation in (4.4.3) can also be used as a pricing
mechanism to achieve improved sum-rate performance in a system with no
uncertainty where ǫ is a design parameter, with all the analytical results
presented here still being valid.
4.7 Simulation results
In this section, the behaviour of the equilibrium under varying uncertainty
bounds is investigated through numerical simulations. The simulations are
computed for a system with Q users and N frequencies averaged over 5000
channel realizations. The channel gains are Hrq(k) ∼ NC(0, 1) for r 6= q
and Hqq(k) ∼ NC(0, 2.25). The channel uncertainty model used is nominal
value Frq(k) = F
true
rq (k)(1 + erq(k)) with erq(k) ∼ U(−
δ
2 ,
δ
2), δ < 1. The
specific parameter values used for the simulations are provided with each
figure. In these simulations, the actual convergence of the algorithm for
every channel realization is tested, i.e., the simulations are not limited only
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Figure 4.1: Sum-rate of the system vs. uncertainty δ.
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Figure 4.2: Sum-rate of the system vs. number of users, Q.
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Figure 4.3: Sum-rate of the system vs. number of frequencies, N .
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Figure 4.4: Average number of channels occupied per user vs. uncer-
tainty, δ.
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Figure 4.5: Average number of channels occupied per user vs. number
of users, Q.
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Figure 4.6: Average number of iterations vs. uncertainty, δ.
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Figure 4.7: Average number of iterations vs. number of users, Q.
to channels satisfying the convergence condition (4.6.2). (Refer to Section 5.3
for simulations which are limited to channels satisfying (4.6.2). It can be seen
that there is little difference in the average behaviour of the equilibrium.)
Note that the zero uncertainty solution corresponds to the Nash equilib-
rium and the nominal solution is the solution resulting from using the erro-
neous channel values in the traditional rate-maximization game G S without
accounting for its uncertainty. The effect of uncertainty, number of users and
number of frequencies on the average sum-rate of the system, the average
number of frequencies occupied by each user and the average number of iter-
ations for convergence are examined. In these figures, the Nash equilibrium
point is when the uncertainty is zero.
In Figure 4.1, it can be observed that the sum-rate at the Nash equilib-
Section 4.7. Simulation results 113
rium under perfect CSI is less than the sum-rate at the robust-optimization
equilibrium under imperfect CSI and that the gap in performance increases
to about 20% as the uncertainty δ increases to 0.5. Under imperfect CSI,
the power allocation using the robust-optimization equilibrium in (4.4.3) and
(4.5.1) has higher sum-rate as uncertainty increases.3 This is because the
users are more cautious about using frequencies with significant interference,
thus reducing the total amount of interference in the system.
In Figure 4.2, it can be observed that the sum-rate of the system under
the robust solution drops from about 105 nats/transmission to about 80
nats/transmission when the number of users rises from 2 to 7. This is because
having a greater number of users results in higher interference for all users
and this effect is strong enough to counter user diversity which would have
resulted in higher sum-rates if the users were on an FDMA scheme. In
Figure 4.3, it can be observed that the sum-rate of the system improves
with increase in number of frequencies and also that the robust solution
continues to perform better than the nominal solution even when the number
of frequencies increases.
In Figure 4.4, it can be seen that the robust solution results in a lower
average number of channels per user as the uncertainty, δ increases. Also,
the total number of channels each user occupies at the robust-optimization
equilibrium is less than at the nominal solution, regardless of the number of
users, as can be seen in Figure 4.5. This implies that the users are using a
3(4.4.3) and (4.5.1) are in terms of absolute uncertainty ǫ while the simulations
use relative uncertainty δ. They are equivalent to one another.
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smaller number of frequencies, which demonstrates the better partitioning
of the frequency space among the users to reduce interference. Hence, this
leads to the higher sum-rates as observed in Figure 4.1.
In Figures 4.6 and 4.7, it can be observed that the average number of
iterations for convergence increases as the uncertainty δ and the number
of users Q increase respectively. This is as expected from Lemma 4.1 and
Corollary 4.3.1, as the modulus of the block-contraction in (4.4.13) increases
as the uncertainty increases. This indicates that the step size of each itera-
tion reduces as uncertainty increases, leading to slower convergence. Thus,
the trade-off for robust solutions with higher sum-rates is in a higher number
of iterations before convergence.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, a robust framework for rate-maximization games under
bounded channel uncertainty was developed. After defining the robust rate-
maximization game, closed-form expressions for the equilibrium solution
were derived. An asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorithm for comput-
ing the equilibrium was proposed. Sufficient conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence of the iterative algorithm to
the equilibrium were presented. Finally, simulation results demonstrating
the effect of uncertainty on the performance of the game were presented.
The interesting effect of improvement in sum-rate with higher channel un-
certainty bounds was observed in the simulation results and is the focus of
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analysis in the next chapter.
Appendix 4.A Proof of Theorem 4.1
The optimization problem in (4.4.1) is convex and admits a unique solution
since the cost function is strictly concave for pq > 0. The Lagrangian L for
this problem can be written as,
L =
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
Φq(k)
)
−
1
µq
( N∑
k=1
pq(k)− 1
)
−
N∑
k=1
vkpq(k)+
N∑
k=1
λk
(
pq(k)− p
max
q (k)
)
,
(4.A.1)
where Φq(k) is defined in (4.4.4). Note that Φq(k) is independent of the
optimization variable pq(k).
The KKT optimality conditions [Refer Appendix 3.A] for problem (4.4.1)
are
(
1 +
pq(k)
Φq(k)
)−1
1
Φq(k)
−
1
µq
− vk + λk = 0, (4.A.2)
λk ≥ 0; vk ≥ 0, (4.A.3)
pq(k) ≥ 0; pq(k) ≤ p
max
q (k), (4.A.4)
λk
(
pq(k)− p
max
q (k)
)
= 0; vkpq(k) = 0, (4.A.5)
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = 1. (4.A.6)
for k = 1, . . . , N .
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To avoid the problem becoming infeasible or having the trivial solution
pq(k) = p
max
q (k) ∀k, it is assumed that
∑N
k=1 p
max
q > 1. From constraint
(4.A.6), pq(k) > 0 for at least one k. Since Φq(k) > 0, it implies that
−1/µq − vk + λk < 0. Further, at any instance, at most one among λk
and vk can be non-zero for a feasible solution, based on the complementary
slackness conditions in (4.A.5) which implies that µq > 0.
When 0 < pq(k) < p
max
q (k), λk = 0 and vk = 0, from the complementary
slackness conditions in (4.A.5). Thus, from (4.A.2)
(
1 +
pq(k)
Φq(k)
)−1
1
Φq(k)
−
1
µq
= 0, (4.A.7)
which gives
pq(k) = µq − Φq(k), (4.A.8)
where µq is chosen such that constraint (4.A.6) is satisfied. Substituting for
Φq(k) from (4.4.4) and including the boundary values 0 and p
max
q (k), the
optimum power allocation for the problem (P1) is the following waterfilling
solution:
p∗q(k) =
[
µq − σ
2
q (k)−
∑
r 6=q
Frq(k)pr(k)− ǫq
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
]pmaxq (k)
0
(4.A.9)
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Appendix 4.B Proof of Lemma 4.1
Given the waterfilling mapping RWFS(·) defined as
RWFS(p) = (RWFSq(p−q))q∈Ω : P 7→ P, (4.B.1)
where P , P1 × · · · × PQ, with Pq and RWF
S
q(p−q) respectively defined in
(4.3.2) and (4.4.6), the block-maximum norm is defined as [62]
∥∥RWFS(p)∥∥w
2,block
, max
q∈Ω
∥∥RWFSq(pq)∥∥2
wq
, (4.B.2)
where w , [w1, . . . , wQ]
T > 0 is any positive weight vector. The vector
weighted maximum norm is given by [107]
||x||w∞,vec , max
q∈Ω
|xq|
wq
, w > 0, x ∈ RQ. (4.B.3)
The matrix weighted maximum norm is given by [107]
||A||w∞,mat , maxq
1
wq
Q∑
r=1
|[A]qr|wr, A ∈ R
Q×Q. (4.B.4)
The mapping RWFS(·) is said to be a block-contraction4 with modulus
α with respect to the norm
∥∥ · ∥∥w
2,block
if there exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that,
4The mapping T is called a block-contraction with modulus α ∈ [0, 1) if it is a
contraction in the block-maximum norm with modulus α [62].
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∀p(1),p(2) ∈ P,
∥∥RWFS(p(1))− RWFS(p(2))∥∥w
2,block
≤ α
∥∥p(1) − p(2)∥∥w
2,block
, (4.B.5)
where p(i) =
(
p
(i)
q , . . . ,p
(i)
q
)
for i = 1, 2.
Given f
(i)
q =
[√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(1)
(i), . . . ,
√∑
r 6=q p
2
r(N)
(i)
]T
for i = 1, 2, for each
q ∈ Ω, let ∆fq ,
∥∥∥f (1)q − f (2)q ∥∥∥
2
and p−q(k)
(i) ,
[
p1(k)
(i), . . . , pq−1(k)
(i),
pq+1(k)
(i), . . . , pQ(k)
(i)
]
. Then,
∆fq =
 N∑
k=1
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
(1) −
√∑
r 6=q
p2r(k)
(2)
2

1
2
, (4.B.6)
=
[
N∑
k=1
(∥∥p−q(k)(1)∥∥2 − ∥∥p−q(k)(2)∥∥2)2
] 1
2
, (4.B.7)
≤
[
N∑
k=1
∥∥∥p−q(k)(1) − p−q(k)(2)∥∥∥2
2
] 1
2
, (4.B.8)
=
 N∑
k=1
∑
r 6=q
(
p2r(k)
(1) + p2r(k)
(2) − 2pr(k)
(1)pr(k)
(2)
)
1
2
, (4.B.9)
=
[∑
r 6=q
∥∥∥p(1)r − p(2)r ∥∥∥2
2
] 1
2
. (4.B.10)
where (4.B.8) follows from [107, Lemma 5.1.2]. Now, define for each q ∈ Ω,
eRWFSq ,
∥∥∥RWFSq (p(1)−q)− RWFSq (p(2)−q)∥∥∥
2
, (4.B.11)
eq ,
∥∥∥p(1)q − p(2)q ∥∥∥
2
. (4.B.12)
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Then, using (4.4.6) in (4.B.11), eRWFSq can be written as
eRWFSq =
∥∥∥∥[− σq −∑r 6=q Frqp(1)r − ǫqf (1)q ]
Pq
−
[
− σq −
∑
r 6=q Frqp
(2)
r − ǫqf
(2)
q
]
Pq
∥∥∥∥
2
, (4.B.13)
≤
∥∥∥∑r 6=q Frqp(1)r + ǫqf (1)q −∑r 6=q Frqp(2)r − ǫqf (2)q ∥∥∥
2
, (4.B.14)
=
∥∥∥∥∑
r 6=q
Frq
(
p(1)r − p
(2)
r
)
+ ǫq
(
f (1)q − f
(2)
q
)∥∥∥∥
2
, (4.B.15)
≤
∥∥∥∥∑
r 6=q
Frq
(
p(1)r − p
(2)
r
)∥∥∥∥
2
+ ǫq
∥∥∥f (1)q − f (2)q ∥∥∥
2
, (4.B.16)
≤
∥∥∥∑
r 6=q
Frq
(
p(1)r − p
(2)
r
)∥∥∥
2
+ ǫq
∑
r 6=q
∥∥∥p(1)r − p(2)r ∥∥∥2
2

1
2
(4.B.17)
≤
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k
Frq(k)
)∥∥∥p(1)r − p(2)r ∥∥∥
2
+ ǫq
∑
r 6=q
∥∥∥p(1)r − p(2)r ∥∥∥2
2

1
2
, (4.B.18)
=
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k∈Dq∩Dr
Frq(k)
)
er + ǫq
[∑
r 6=q
e2r
] 1
2
, (4.B.19)
≤
∑
r 6=q
(
[Smax]rq + ǫq
)
er, (4.B.20)
∀ p
(1)
q ,p
(2)
q ∈ Pq and ∀ q ∈ Ω, where: (4.B.14) follows from the nonexpansive
property of the waterfilling projection [92, Lemma 3]; (4.B.16) follows from
the triangle inequality [107]; (4.B.17) follows from (4.B.10); (4.B.18) and
(4.B.19) follow from the definitions of Frq and eq respectively from (4.4.7)
and (4.B.12); and (4.B.20) follows from the definition of Smax in (4.4.12)
and Jensen’s inequality [51].
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The set of inequalities in (4.B.20) can be written in vector form as
0 ≤ eRWFS ≤ (S
max +E)e, (4.B.21)
where E is defined in (4.4.11) and the vectors eRWFS and e are defined as
eRWFS ,
[
eRWFS1 , . . . , eRWFSQ
]T
, and e = [e1. . . . , eQ]
T . (4.B.22)
Using the vector and matrix weighted maximum norms from (4.B.3) and
(4.B.4) respectively, (4.B.21) can be written as
∥∥eRWFS∥∥w∞,vec ≤ ∥∥(Smax +E)e∥∥w∞,vec, (4.B.23)
≤
∥∥Smax +E∥∥w
∞,mat
·
∥∥e∥∥w
∞,vec
, (4.B.24)
∀ w > 0. Using the block-maximum norm (4.B.2),
∥∥eRWFS∥∥w∞,vec = ∥∥RWFS (p(1))− RWFS (p(2))∥∥w2,block, (4.B.25)
≤
∥∥Smax +E∥∥w
∞,mat
∥∥∥p(1)r − p(2)r ∥∥∥w
2,block
, (4.B.26)
∀p(2),p(2) ∈ P, with E and S as defined in (4.4.11) and (4.4.12) respectively.
It is clear that RWFS(·) is a block contraction when ||Smax + E||w∞,mat <
1.
Section 4.C. Proof of Theorem 4.2 121
Appendix 4.C Proof of Theorem 4.2
From [108], every concave game5 has at least one equilibrium. For the game
G Srob:
1. The set of feasible strategy profiles, Pq of each player q is compact
and convex.
2. The payoff function of each player q in (4.3.6) is continuous in p ∈ P
and concave in pq ∈ Pq.
Thus, the game G Srob has at least one equilibrium. From Lemma 4.1, the
waterfilling mapping RWFS(·) is a block-contraction if (4.4.14) is satisfied
for some w > 0. Thus, the robust-optimization equilibrium of game G Srob is
unique (using [63, Theorem 1]). Since Smax + E is a nonnegative matrix,
there exists a positive vector w¯ such that
||Smax +E||w¯∞,mat < 1 (4.C.1)
Using [62, Corollary 6.1] and the triangle inequality [107], this is satisfied
when
||Smax||w¯∞,mat + ||E||
w¯
∞,mat < 1 ⇒ ρ(S
max) < 1− ρ(E). (4.C.2)
5A game is said to be concave if the payoff functions are concave and the sets of
admissible strategies are compact and convex.
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Appendix 4.D Proof of Theorem 4.3
From Lemma 4.1 and (4.C.1) the waterfilling mapping RWFS(·) is a block-
contraction. From [63, Theorem 2], the robust iterative waterfilling algo-
rithm described in Algorithm 4.1 converges to the unique robust-optimization
equilibrium of game G Srob for any set of feasible initial conditions and any up-
date schedule.
Chapter 5
SUM-RATE ANALYSIS IN
THE TWO-USER SCENARIO
In this chapter, the effect of uncertainty on the sum-rate and efficiency of the
system for the two-user scenario in the game G Srob presented in the previous
chapter is analysed (Refer to Section 2.3 for a discussion on equilibrium
efficiency). The sum-rate of the system, S, is given by
S =
Q∑
q=1
Rq. (5.0.1)
where Rq is the information rate of user q as defined in (4.2.5). In game
G Srob, the price of stability and anarchy are the same under the sufficient
conditions in Theorem 4.2 due to the existence of a unique equilibrium.
Thus, the price of anarchy, PoA, defined as the ratio of the sum-rate of the
system at the social optimal solution, S∗, and the sum-rate of the system at
123
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the robust-optimization equilibrium, Srob, is given by
PoA =
S∗
Srob
. (5.0.2)
Note that a lower price of anarchy indicates that the robust-optimization
equilibrium is more efficient.
For the two user case in the game G Srob, the worst-case interference in
each frequency reduces to
(
Frq(k)+ ǫq
)
pr(k) with q, r = 1, 2 and q 6= r. This
means that the robust waterfilling operation for the two user case (Q = 2)
is simply the standard waterfilling solution with the worst-case channel co-
efficients. For the sake of clarity, the analysis here is restricted to both users
having identical noise variance σ21(k) = σ
2
2(k) = σ
2 ∀k across all frequencies,
identical uncertainty bounds ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ and identical total power con-
straints
∑N
k=1 p1(k) =
∑N
k=1 p2(k) = PT . The results presented here can be
extended to the non-identical case along similar lines. In order to develop a
clear understanding of the the behaviour of the equilibrium, the sum-rate of
the system is first analyzed for a system with two frequencies (N = 2) and
then extended to systems with large (N →∞) number of frequencies.
5.1 Two frequency case (N = 2)
Consider a two-frequency anti-symmetric system as shown in Figure 5.1
where the channel gains are |H11(1)|
2 = |H11(2)|
2 = 1, |H22(1)|
2 = |H22(2)|
2 =
1, |H12(2)|
2 = |H21(1)|
2 = α and |H12(1)|
2 = |H21(2)|
2 = mα with m > 1
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Tx 1
Tx 2
Rx 1
Rx 2
[α,mα]
[mα,α]
[1,1]
[1,1]
Figure 5.1: Anti-symmetric system with Q = 2, N = 2, ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ.
The noise variances for both users in both frequencies are σ2. The
channel gains are: |H11(1)|
2 = |H11(2)|
2 = |H22(1)|
2 = |H22(2)|
2 =
1; |H12(2)|
2 = |H21(1)|
2 = α and |H12(1)|
2 = |H21(2)|
2 = mα with
m > 1 and 0 < α < 1. The power allocations for this system at the
robust-optimization equilibrium are presented in (5.1.1).
and 0 < α < 1. The total power constraint for the two users is p1(1)+p1(2) =
1 and p2(1)+p2(2) = 1. From (4.4.3) the power allocations at the equilibrium
are,
p1(1) =
(
µ1 − σ
2 − (α+ ǫ)p2(1)
)+
,
p1(2) =
(
µ1 − σ
2 − (mα+ ǫ)p2(2)
)+
,
p2(1) =
(
µ2 − σ
2 − (mα+ ǫ)p1(1)
)+
,
p2(2) =
(
µ2 − σ
2 − (α+ ǫ)p1(2)
)+
.
(5.1.1)
The following theorem presents the effect of uncertainty on the sum-rate and
price of anarchy of the system for the high interference and low interference
cases:
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Theorem 5.1. For the two-user two-frequency anti-symmetric system de-
scribed in Figure 5.1:
• High interference: When σ2 ≪ α(1−p), the sum-rate increases and the
price of anarchy decreases as the channel uncertainty bound increases.
• Low interference: When σ2 ≫ mαp, the sum-rate decreases and the
price of anarchy increases as the channel uncertainty bound increases.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.
From this result, it is evident that the robust-optimization equilibrium
behaves in opposite ways when there is high interference and when there is
low interference in the system. This suggests that there might be a certain
level of interference where the sum-rate and price of anarchy do not change
with change in uncertainty. This is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. At the level of interference α = αo, where
αo =
σ2
2m
((
(m+ 1)2 +
4m
σ2
) 1
2
−m− 1
)
, (5.1.2)
the sum-rate and the price of anarchy are independent of the level of uncer-
tainty or the power allocation used. Furthermore, at this value of interfer-
ence, the price of anarchy is equal to unity.
Proof. See Appendix 5.B
It can be seen that even for such a simple system, the global behaviour of
the robust-optimization equilibrium appears to be quite complex. This in-
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dicates that the global properties of the robust-optimization equilibrium for
larger systems is quite strongly dependent on the level of interference in the
system, which is seen in the subsequent results for systems with large num-
ber of frequencies. However, the underlying behaviour of the equilibrium for
the two-frequency case is that the equilibrium moves towards the frequency
division multiple access (FDMA) solution as the uncertainty bound increases
(from (5.A.2)). This helps in providing a way to analyze the equilibrium be-
haviour for systems with large number of frequencies in the following section.
5.2 Large number of frequencies (N →∞)
In this section, the equilibrium behaviour is characterized for the two-user
system with a large number of frequencies. As seen from the previous section,
the equilibrium tends to move towards the FDMA solution as uncertainty
bound increases. In order to quantify this effect, the quantity J(k), defined
as
J(k) , −p1(k)p2(k), (5.2.1)
is used as a measure of the extent of partitioning of the frequency k between
the two users. It is minimum (J(k) = −1) when both the users allocate all
their total power to the same frequency k and is maximum (J(k) = 0) when
at most one user is occupying the frequency k. Note that J(k) = 0 ∀k ∈
{1, . . . , N} when the users adopt an FDMA scheme.
The following lemma describes the effect of the uncertainty bound on
the extent of partitioning of the system:
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Lemma 5.1. For the two-user case in the game G Srob, when the number of
frequencies, N → ∞, the extent of partitioning in every frequency is non-
decreasing as the uncertainty bound of the system increases for any set of
channel values, i.e.,
∂
∂ǫ
J(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N} when N →∞, (5.2.2)
with equality for frequencies where J(k) = 0, where J(k) is defined in (5.2.1).
Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
The above lemma suggests that the robust-optimization equilibriummoves
towards greater frequency-space partitioning as the uncertainty bound in-
creases when there is a large number of frequencies in the system. In other
words, the equilibrium is moving closer to an FDMA solution under increased
channel uncertainty. When the FDMA solution is globally (sum-rate) op-
timal, this will lead to an improvement in the sum-rate at the equilibrium.
This is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2. For the two-user case in the game G Srob, as the number of fre-
quencies, N →∞, the sum-rate (price of anarchy) at the robust-optimization
equilibrium of the system is non-decreasing (non-increasing) as the uncer-
tainty bound increases if, ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(
F21(k)− ǫ
)(
F12(k)− ǫ
)
>
1
4
. (5.2.3)
Proof. See Appendix 5.D.
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For the special case of frequency-flat systems, at the equilibrium, all
users have equal power allocation to all frequencies. This solution is not
dependent on the uncertainty in the CSI. This leads to no change in the
extent of partitioning and thus sum-rate and price of anarchy are not affected
by uncertainty.
Also, the results of this section are not just limited to the robust-optimization
equilibrium for the system presented here. When the uncertainty ǫ = 0, the
framework presented here can be used to analyse the behaviour of the Nash
equilibrium of the iterative waterfilling algorithm as a function of the inter-
ference coefficients.
5.3 Simulation results
In this section, some simulation results to study the impact of channel un-
certainty on the equilibrium are presented. Figure 5.2 shows the simulation
results for the two user and two frequency scenario and Figure 5.3 shows the
results for a two user case with N = 8 frequencies.
The sum-rate of the system in Figure 5.1 under high interference condi-
tions is plotted as a function of interference and uncertainty in Figure 5.2a.
The flat region corresponds to the sum-rate at Pareto optimal solution
(FDMA) and the edge of the surface corresponds to the sufficient condition
in (4.5.2). It can be seen that the Nash equilibrium (when the uncertainty
bound ǫ = 0) moves closer to the Pareto optimal solution as the interference
increases. It is also evident that the sum-rate increases for a fixed interfer-
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Figure 5.2: Simulation results for the anti-symmetric system in Fig-
ure 5.1. Note that the zero uncertainty corresponds to the Nash equi-
librium
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(c) Average number of iterations vs. uncertainty δ.
Figure 5.3: Simulation results demonstrating the effect of channel un-
certainty on (a) Sum-rate, (b) Average number of channels/user, (c)
Average number of iterations for a system with σ = 0.1, Q = 2
users and N = 8 frequencies averaged over 1000 runs. Channel gains
Hrq(k) ∼ NC(0, 1) for r 6= q, Hqq(k) ∼ NC(0, 4). Channel un-
certainty model: nominal value Frq(k) = F
true
rq (k)(1 + erq(k)) with
erq(k) ∼ U(−
δ
2
, δ
2
), δ < 1. The simulations are limited to channels
which satisfy the sufficiency condition in (4.5.2). Note that the zero
uncertainty solution corresponds to the Nash equilibrium.
ence as uncertainty increases, as expected from Theorem 5.1. In Figure 5.2b,
the sum-rate at low interference is plotted as a function of interference and
uncertainty. As expected from Theorem 5.1, the sum-rate decreases as the
uncertainty bound increases. Simulation results similar to those in Sec-
tion 4.7 for a two-user system with 8 frequencies are presented in Figure 5.3.
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As seen before, improvement in sum-rate due to lower channel occupancy
leads to a trade-off in increased number of iterations to convergence.
From these simulations it can be seen that the analytical results derived
in Section 5.2 for very large number of frequencies also hold true for a fi-
nite number of frequencies. From the simulation results and the theoretical
analysis, it can be concluded that the robust-optimization equilibrium moves
towards an FDMA solution as the uncertainty bound increases.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, the efficiency of the equilibrium of the robust rate-maximization
game proposed in Chapter 4 was investigated for the two-user scenario. In
order to develop a clearer understanding of the behaviour of the equilibrium,
a simple two-frequency system was first analyzed. The effect of uncertainty
on the sum-rate and the price of anarchy of this two-frequency system were
derived for two regimes, viz. high interference and low interference. Fol-
lowing this, the effect of uncertainty on the sum-rate and price of anarchy
of a two-user system with asymptotically large number of frequencies were
characterized. Finally, these effects were demonstrated through simulation
results.
Appendix 5.A Proof of Theorem 5.1
Let p1(1) = p. Hence, by symmetry, p1(2) = p2(1) = 1 − p, p2(2) = p and
µ1 = µ2 = µ. Consider the interior operating points of the robust waterfilling
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operator RWFSq(·) where it is linear. Eliminating µ from (5.1.1),
p =
1− α− ǫ
2
(
1− (m+ 1)α2 − ǫ
) ≥ 0.5. (5.A.1)
The gradient of p with respect to ǫ is
∂ p
∂ ǫ
=
(m− 1)α
4
(
1− (m+ 1)α2 − ǫ
)2 > 0. (5.A.2)
Thus, the robust-optimization equilibrium moves towards the FDMA solu-
tion as the uncertainty bound increases.
The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for the two users in
the two frequency bins is given by
SINR1(1) = SINR2(2) =
p
σ2 + α(1− p)
, (5.A.3)
SINR1(2) = SINR2(1) =
1− p
σ2 +mαp
. (5.A.4)
and the sum-rate of the system is
S , 2 log
(
1 +
p
σ2 + α(1− p)
)
+ 2 log
(
1 +
1− p
σ2 +mαp
)
. (5.A.5)
Case 1: High interference scenario
In the high interference scenario, σ2 ≪ α(1− p). Let ξ = p/α(1− p). Then,
the SINR for the two users in the two frequency bins can be approximated
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as
SINR1(1) = SINR2(2) ≈
p
α(1− p)
= ξ ,
SINR1(2) = SINR2(1) ≈
1− p
mαp
=
1
mα2ξ
.
(5.A.6)
The sum-rate of the system at high interference can be approximated as
S ≈ 2 log
(
(1 + ξ)
(
1 +
1
mα2ξ
))
, (5.A.7)
= 2 log
(
1 +
1
mα2
+ ξ +
1
mα2ξ
)
. (5.A.8)
The goal here is to analyse the behaviour of the sum-rate S as the uncer-
tainty ǫ increases. To this end, it has to be shown that the gradient of the
sum-rate with respect to ǫ is positive. Since log(x) increases monotonically
with x, consider
∂
∂ ǫ
(ξ +
1
mα2ξ
) =
(
1−
1
mα2ξ2
)
∂ ξ
∂ ǫ
,
=
(
1−
(1− p)2
mp2
)
∂ ξ
∂ ǫ
,
(5.A.9)
and (1− (1−p)
2
mp2
) > 0 since p ≥ 0.5 and m > 1. Now,
∂ ξ
∂ ǫ
=
1
α(1− p)2
∂ p
∂ ǫ
. (5.A.10)
From (5.A.2), (5.A.9) and (5.A.10),
∂ S
∂ ǫ
> 0. (5.A.11)
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Thus, the sum-rate of the system increases as the uncertainty ǫ increases.
This also shows that the robust-optimization equilibrium achieves a higher
sum-rate in the presence of channel uncertainty (ǫ > 0) than the Nash equi-
librium at zero uncertainty (ǫ = 0).
The social optimal solution for this system at high interference is fre-
quency division multiplexing [23]. In other words, the frequency space is
fully partitioned at the social optimal solution. The sum-rate at the social
optimal solution for the given system at high interference, S∗, is given by
S∗ = 2 log
(
1 +
1
σ2
)
. (5.A.12)
The price of anarchy at high interference, PoA, is
PoA =
log
(
1 + 1
σ2
)
log
(
1 + 1
mα2
+ ξ + 1
mα2ξ
) . (5.A.13)
Since ∂ S∂ ǫ > 0, it implies that
∂ PoA
∂ ǫ < 0.
Case 2: Low interference scenario
In the low interference scenario, i.e. whenmαp≪ σ2, the signal-to-interference+noise
ratio SINR for the two users in the two frequency bins can be approximately
written as
SINR1(1) = SINR2(2) ≈
p
σ2
,
SINR1(2) = SINR2(1) ≈
1− p
σ2
.
(5.A.14)
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The sum-rate of the system at low interference can be approximated as
S ≈ 2 log
((
1 +
p
σ2
)(
1 +
1− p
σ2
))
, (5.A.15)
= 2 log
(
1 +
1
σ2
+
p− p2
σ2
)
. (5.A.16)
Now,
∂ S
∂ ǫ
=
(
1 +
1
σ2
+
p− p2
σ2
)−1
(1− 2p)
σ2
∂ p
∂ ǫ
< 0. (5.A.17)
At low interference, the system behaves similar to a parallel Gaussian
channel system. The social optimal solution in this scenario is the waterfill-
ing solution and leads to equal power allocation to both bins. The sum-rate
at the social optimal solution for the given system at low interference, S∗,
is given by
S∗ = 4 log
(
1 +
1
2σ2
)
. (5.A.18)
The price of anarchy at low interference, PoA, is
PoA =
4 log
(
1 + 1
2σ2
)
2 log
(
1 + 1
σ2
+ p−p
2
σ2
) = log (1 + 1σ2 + 14σ4 )
log
(
1 + 1
σ2
+ p−p
2
σ2
) . (5.A.19)
Note that, at low interference, mαp ≪ 1. From (5.A.1), p ≈ 0.5. Thus
the PoA is close to unity. Since ∂ S∂ ǫ < 0,
∂
∂ ǫ PoA > 0.
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Appendix 5.B Proof of Proposition 5.1
The gradient of the sum-rate Srob with respect to ǫ is
∂ Srob
∂ ǫ
=
∂ Srob
∂ p
∂ p
∂ ǫ
. (5.B.1)
From (5.A.2), we have ∂ p∂ ǫ > 0. Now,
∂ Srob
∂ p
= 2
1
σ2+α(1−p)
+ αp
(σ2+α(1−p))2
1 + p
σ2+α(1−p)
− 2
1
σ2+mαp
+ (1−p)mα
(σ2+mαp)2
1 + 1−p
σ2+mαp
. (5.B.2)
Setting ∂ Srob∂ p = 0, we solve for α to get the following roots,
α =

0,
−σ2
2m
(
m+ 1±
(
4m/σ2 + (m+ 1)2
) 1
2
)
,
σ2(2p−1)
(m−1)p2+2p−1
.
(5.B.3)
The positive root that is independent of ǫ and p (which is a function of the
uncertainty ǫ, from (5.A.1)) is the required solution where the sum-rate is
constant regardless of uncertainty. Thus, the required interference value is
given by
αo =
σ2
2m
((
4m/σ2 + (m+ 1)2
) 1
2 −m− 1
)
. (5.B.4)
Since the root αo of
∂ Srob
∂ p is independent of p, different power allocation
schemes (resulting in different values of p) will result in the same sum-rate
at α = αo. Thus, the price of anarchy at α = αo is unity.
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Appendix 5.C Proof of Lemma 5.1
From (4.4.3), the power allocations for the two users at the robust-optimization
equilibrium in the kth frequency are
p1(k) =
(
µ1 − σ
2 − (F21 + ǫ)p2(k)
)+
, (5.C.1)
p2(k) =
(
µ2 − σ
2 − (F12 + ǫ)p1(k)
)+
, (5.C.2)
with
∑N
k=1 p1(k) =
∑N
k=1 p2(k) = PT .
Let D1,D2 and Dol be the sets of frequencies exclusively used by user
1, user 2 and by both respectively and n1 , |D1| and n2 , |D2| be the
number of frequencies exclusively used by user 1 and user 2 respectively at
the equilibrium. Then, from (5.C.1), p1(k) = µ1−σ
2
1 and p2(k) = 0 ∀ k ∈ D1
and p1(k) = 0 and p2(k) = µ2 − σ
2
1 ∀ k ∈ D2. The power remaining for
allocation to the frequencies in Dol , {k1, . . . , kol} by user 1 and user 2 is
(1− n1(µ1 − σ
2)) and (1− n2(µ2 − σ
2)) respectively.
This separation of the frequency-space into exclusive-use and overlapped-
use frequencies allows us to analyse the system without the nonlinear opera-
tion (·)+. Thus, the power allocations at the fixed point in the overlapped-use
frequency-space can be expressed as a system of linear equations,
p1(k) +
(
F21(k) + ǫ
)
p2(k)− µ1 − σ
2 = 0, k ∈ Dol (5.C.3)(
F12(k) + ǫ
)
p1(k) + p2(k)− µ2 − σ
2 = 0, k ∈ Dol (5.C.4)∑
k∈Dol
p1(k) + n1(µ1 − σ
2) = PT , (5.C.5)
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∑
k∈Dol
p2(k) + n2(µ2 − σ
2) = PT . (5.C.6)
Writing these in matrix form,

Ak1 0 −I2
. . .
...
0 Akol −I2
I2 · · · I2 D


p(k1)
...
p(kol)
µ

=

02
...
02
pt

(5.C.7)
where
Ak ,
 1 F21(k) + ǫ
F12(k) + ǫ 1
 , D ,
n1 0
0 n2
 ,
p(k) ,
p1(k)
p2(k)
 , pt ,
PT
PT
 and µ ,
µ1 − σ2
µ2 − σ
2
 .
(5.C.8)
Let
A ,

Ak1 0
. . .
0 Akol
 , B ,

−I2
...
−I2
 ,
C ,
[
I2 . . . I2
]
and P ,

p(k1)
...
p(kol)
 .
(5.C.9)
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so that (5.C.7) can be written as
A B
C D

P
µ
 =
 0
pt
 . (5.C.10)
This system can be solved to get
P
µ
 =
A B
C D

−1  0
pt
 =
W X
Y Z

 0
pt
 =
Xpt
Zpt
 , (5.C.11)
where A B
C D

−1
=
W X
Y Z
 . (5.C.12)
Using [109, Fact 10.12.9] and differentiating (5.C.11) with respect to ǫ,
∂
∂ǫ
P
µ
 = −
A B
C D

−1  ∂∂ǫ A 0
0 0

A B
C D

−1  0
pt
 , (5.C.13)
= −
W X
Y Z

 ∂∂ǫ A 0
0 0

W X
Y Z

 0
pt
 , (5.C.14)
= −
W( ∂∂ǫ A)X pt
Y( ∂∂ǫ A)X pt
 . (5.C.15)
Due to the nature of the waterfilling function, n1 and n2 are non-decreasing
piecewise-constant functions of ǫ. The above derivative exists only in the
regions where n1 and n2 are constant. Using [109, Proposition 2.8.7], the
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partitioned matrix inverse can be written as
W = A−1 +A−1B(D−CA−1B)−1CA−1, (5.C.16)
X = −A−1B(D−CA−1B)−1, (5.C.17)
Y = −(D−CA−1B)−1CA−1, (5.C.18)
Z = (D−CA−1B)−1. (5.C.19)
Using
A−1 =

A−1k1 0
. . .
0 A−1kol
 , (5.C.20)
it can be shown that (the detailed derivations are provided at the end of this
proof),
W =

A−1k1 −A
−1
k1
ZA−1k1 · · · −A
−1
k1
ZA−1kol
...
...
−A−1kolZA
−1
k1
· · · A−1kol −A
−1
kol
ZA−1kol
 , (5.C.21)
X =

A−1k1 Z
...
A−1kolZ
 , (5.C.22)
Y = −
[
ZA−1k1 · · · ZA
−1
kol
]
, (5.C.23)
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Z =
1
∆̂

n2 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
∑
k∈Dol
F21(i) + ǫ
∆i∑
k∈Dol
F12(i) + ǫ
∆i
n1 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
 , (5.C.24)
where
∆i , det(Ai) = 1−
(
F21(i) + ǫ
)(
F12(i) + ǫ
)
, (5.C.25)
∆̂ ,
n1 + ∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
n2 + ∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i

−
 ∑
k∈Dol
F21(i) + ǫ
∆i
 ∑
k∈Dol
F12(i) + ǫ
∆i
 , (5.C.26)
A−1i =
 1∆i −F21(i)+ǫ∆i
−F12(i)+ǫ∆i
1
∆i
 . (5.C.27)
Thus, from (5.C.11) and (5.C.15),
P = Xpt =
[
A−1k1 Zpt . . . A
−1
kol
Zpt
]T
, (5.C.28)
and
∂P
∂ ǫ
= −W(
∂A
∂ ǫ
)X, (5.C.29)
=

kol∑
i=k1
A−1k1 ZA
−1
i GA
−1
i Zpt −A
−1
k1
GA−1k1 Zpt
...
kol∑
i=k1
A−1kolZA
−1
i GA
−1
i Zpt −A
−1
kol
GA−1kolZpt

, (5.C.30)
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where
G =
∂Ai
∂ ǫ
=
0 1
1 0
 ∀ i = 1, . . . , N. (5.C.31)
Therefore, for k = k1, . . . , kol,
p(k) =
p1(k)
p2(k)
 = A−1k Zpt (5.C.32)
and
p′(k) =
∂
∂ǫ
p(k), (5.C.33)
=
p′1(k)
p′2(k)
 , (5.C.34)
=
kol∑
i=k1
A−1k ZA
−1
i GA
−1
i Zpt −A
−1
k GA
−1
k Zpt, (5.C.35)
= A−1k Z
kol∑
i=k1
A−1i GA
−1
i Zpt −A
−1
k GA
−1
k Zpt (5.C.36)
Consider the extent of partitioning J(k) at any frequency k. For fre-
quencies where J(k) = 0, at least one of the users has zero power allocation
and that will not change with change in uncertainty. Thus ∂∂ǫ J(k) = 0 for
k ∈ D1 ∪ D2. Also, in cases when n1 or n2 change due to some frequency k¯
dropping from the set Dol, J(k¯) increases from some negative value to zero.
Now consider the extent of partitioning for frequencies where both users
have non-zero power allocation. Differentiating the extent of partitioning for
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frequency k ∈ Dol with respect to ǫ,
∂
∂ǫ
J(k) =
∂
∂ǫ
(−p1(k)p2(k)) , (5.C.37)
= −p′1(k)p2(k) + p1(k)p
′
2(k), (5.C.38)
= −
p1(k)
p2(k)

T p′2(k)
p′1(k)
 , (5.C.39)
= −
p1(k)
p2(k)

T 0 1
1 0

p′1(k)
p′2(k)
 , (5.C.40)
= −p(k)TGp′(k), (5.C.41)
= −
(
A−1k Zpt
)T
G
(
−A−1k GA
−1
k Zpt
+A−1k Z
kol∑
i=k1
A−1i GA
−1
i Zpt
)
, (5.C.42)
= pt
TZTA−1k
T
GA−1k
(
− Z
kol∑
i=k1
A−1i GA
−1
i G
−1Ak
+I
)
GA−1k Zpt. (5.C.43)
Let qk , GA
−1
k Zpt. UsingG
T = G−1 = G,GA−1i G = A
−T
i andGAkG =
ATk , (5.C.43) can be written as
∂
∂ǫ
J(k) = qTk
(
A−1k −A
−1
k Z
∑kol
i=k1
A−1i A
−T
i A
T
k
)
qk (5.C.44)
LetMk =
∑kol
i=k1
A−1i A
−T
i A
T
k andQk = A
−1
k −A
−1
k ZMk. When nol = o(N)
(i.e., when limN→∞
nol
N = 0), the total number of frequencies, n1 + n2 =
O(N). Since A−1i A
−T
i A
T
k = O(1) for each i and k, Mk = O(nol) and
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Z = O(1/N). Thus,
lim
N→∞
A−1k ZMk = 0 (5.C.45)
which means that
lim
N→∞
Qk +Q
T
k = A
−1
k +A
−T
k ≻ 0 (5.C.46)
from the convergence condition. Thus, xTQkx > 0 ∀x ∈ R
2×1 as its sym-
metric part Qk + Q
T
k is positive definite [107]. Hence,
∂
∂ǫ J(k) ≥ 0 when
N →∞, with equality when J(k) = 0.
Derivation of Inverses
Consider
CA−1B =
[
I2 . . . I2
]

A−1k1 0
. . .
0 A−1kol


−I2
...
−I2
 (5.C.47)
=
[
A−1k1 . . . A
−1
kol
]

−I2
...
−I2
 = −
∑
k∈Dol
A−1i (5.C.48)
= −

∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
−
∑
k∈Dol
F21(i) + ǫ
∆i
−
∑
k∈Dol
F12(i) + ǫ
∆i
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
 (5.C.49)
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where ∆i is defined in (5.C.25). Thus,
D−CA−1B =

n1 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
−
∑
k∈Dol
F21(i) + ǫ
∆i
−
∑
k∈Dol
F12(i) + ǫ
∆i
n2 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
 (5.C.50)
and
Z =
(
D−CA−1B
)−1
=
1
∆̂

n2 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i
∑
k∈Dol
F21(i) + ǫ
∆i∑
k∈Dol
F12(i) + ǫ
∆i
n1 +
∑
k∈Dol
1
∆i

(5.C.51)
where ∆̂ is defined in (5.C.26). Therefore,
X = −A−1B
(
D−CA−1B
)−1
(5.C.52)
=

A−1k1 0
. . .
0 A−1kol


Z
...
Z
 (5.C.53)
=

A−1k1 Z
...
A−1kolZ
 (5.C.54)
and
Y = −
(
D−CA−1B
)−1
CA−1 (5.C.55)
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= −
[
Z . . . Z
]

A−1k1 0
. . .
0 A−1kol
 (5.C.56)
= −
[
ZA−1k1 · · · ZA
−1
kol
]
(5.C.57)
Also,
W −A−1 = A−1B(D−CA−1B)−1CA−1 (5.C.58)
=

A−1k1 0
. . .
0 A−1kol


−I2
...
−I2


ZA−1k1
...
ZA−1kol

T
(5.C.59)
= −

A−1k1
...
A−1kol

[
ZA−1k1 · · · ZA
−1
kol
]
(5.C.60)
= −

A−1k1 ZA
−1
k1
· · · A−1k1 ZA
−1
kol
...
...
A−1kolZA
−1
k1
· · · A−1kolZA
−1
kol
 (5.C.61)
Hence,
W = A−1 +A−1B(D−CA−1B)−1CA−1 (5.C.62)
=

A−1k1 0
. . .
0 A−1kol
−

A−1k1 ZA
−1
k1
· · · A−1k1 ZA
−1
kol
...
...
A−1kolZA
−1
k1
· · · A−1kolZA
−1
kol
 (5.C.63)
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=

A−1k1 −A
−1
k1
ZA−1k1 · · · −A
−1
k1
ZA−1kol
...
...
−A−1kolZA
−1
k1
· · · A−1kol −A
−1
kol
ZA−1kol
 (5.C.64)
Appendix 5.D Proof of Theorem 5.2
Using [23, Corollary 3.1], the sum of the rates of the two users in the fre-
quency k is quasi-convex only if F21(k)F12(k) > 1/4. Let C be the min-
imum number of frequencies occupied by any user. When there are only
two users and a large number of frequencies, C ≫ 1. If the condition
F21(k)F12(k) >
1
4(1 +
1
C−1)
2 is satisfied for some C ≥ 2 for all frequen-
cies k ∈ {1, . . . , N} (thus satisfying F21(k)F12(k) > 1/4), then the Pareto
optimal solution is FDMA [23, Theorem 3.3]. This needs to be satisfied for
the worst-case channel coefficients which leads to (5.2.3). Thus, the solution
moving closer to FDMA will improve the sum-rate of the system. From
Lemma 5.1, the robust equilibrium moves closer to FDMA as uncertainty
increases and thus will result in an improvement in sum-rate.
The Pareto optimal solution under this condition (which is FDMA) is
constant under varying uncertainty bounds as such an uncertainty in the
interference coefficients F12(k) and F21(k) does not affect the FDMA solution
where there is no interference. Thus, an increase in sum-rate will result in
an decrease in price of anarchy.
Chapter 6
ROBUST IWFA FOR MIMO
SYSTEMS
In chapters 4 and 5, a robust rate-maximization game in SISO frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channels under bounded channel uncertainty
was presented and analyzed. In this chapter, a robust framework for rate-
maximization games in multi-antenna systems (MIMO Gaussian interference
channels) based on the robust game model is presented.
The chapter begins with a description of the system model under which
the robust waterfilling solution is developed. This is followed by the formu-
lation of the robust MIMO rate-maximization game under bounded chan-
nel uncertainty. This framework is shown to be a modified MIMO rate-
maximization game (Section 3.5). The equilibrium for this game is then
presented, along with an iterative waterfilling algorithm to compute it. Suf-
ficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence of
the algorithm are then presented. Finally, simulation results are presented
to demonstrate the behaviour of the algorithm.
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6.1 System model
Consider a MIMO Gaussian interference channel composed of Q MIMO
links. The signal vector yq ∈ C
nRq×1 measured at the receiver of user q
is
yq = H˜qqxq +
∑
r 6=q
Hrqxr + nq (6.1.1)
where H˜qq ∈ C
nRq×nTq is the direct-channel matrix between source q and
destination q, Hrq ∈ C
nRq×nTr is the cross-channel matrix between source
r and destination q, xq ∈ C
nTq×1 is the signal vector transmitted by source
q and nq ∈ C
nRq×1 is the receiver noise vector of user q, which is assumed
to be a zero-mean complex Gaussian vector with an arbitrary (nonsingular)
covariance matrix Rnq . The second term in the right hand side of (6.1.1)
is the multi-user interference (MUI) observed at the destination q, which is
treated as additive spatially coloured noise at the receiver of user q.
The system is assumed to be quasi-stationary for the duration of the
transmission. Each receiver is assumed to be able to measure accurately
the covariance matrix of the noise plus MUI generated by the other users.
The direct-channel matrix H˜qq is assumed to be square and nonsingular.
It is estimated by receiver of user q and is assumed to have a bounded
uncertainty of unknown distribution. The uncertainty set Hq of the direct-
channel matrix H˜qq is deterministically modelled as an ellipsoid centered
around the nominal value Hqq,
Hq ,
{
H˜qq , Hqq +∆q : ‖∆q‖F ≤ ǫq
}
(6.1.2)
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Based on this information, each destination q computes the optimal co-
variance matrix Qq , E{xqx
H} for its own link and transmits it back to
its transmitter over a low bit-rate error-free feedback channel. From this
optimal covariance matrix, the beamformer weights of the transmitter can
be computed as
xq =
nTq∑
i=1
λqivqi (6.1.3)
where λqi is the i-th eigenvalue of Qq and vqi is its associated eigenvector.
The nominal information rate of user q, Rq(Qq,Q−q), for this system
can be written as [63]
Rq(Qq,Q−q) = log det(I+H
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)HqqQq) (6.1.4)
where
R−q(Q−q) , Rnq +
∑
r 6=q
HrqQrH
H
rq (6.1.5)
is the interference plus noise covariance matrix observed by destination q,
and Q−q , {Qr}r 6=q is the set of covariance matrices of all users except the
q-th user. Each player q competes rationally against other users in order to
maximize its own information rate Rq(Qq,Q−q) by designing the optimal
covariance matrix Q⋆q , given the constraint
E
{
‖xq‖
2
2
}
= Tr(Qq) ≤ Pq (6.1.6)
where Pq is the maximum average power transmitted in units of energy per
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transmission for user q.
6.2 Robust rate-maximization game formulation
The robust game model (Section 2.5) suggests that when players have un-
certainties in their payoff functions, formulating their best response to the
worst-case payoff functions leads to a stable equilibrium. Motivated by this
approach, a protection function (which is a lower bound on the payoff func-
tion) is formulated for each user, which is then maximized by each user.
Defining the matrices Mq and Eq as
Mq , H
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq, (6.2.1)
Eq , I+H
−1
qq ∆q, (6.2.2)
the protection function for user q, based on the channel uncertainty model
in (6.1.2), is formulated as
R˜q(Qq,Q−q) = log det(I+ H˜
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)H˜qqQq), (6.2.3)
= log det(I+EHq MqEqQq), (6.2.4)
=
nq∑
i=1
log λi(I+E
H
q MqEqQq), (6.2.5)
=
nq∑
i=1
log
(
1 + λi(E
H
q EqMqQq)
)
, (6.2.6)
≥
nq∑
i=1
log
(
1 + λmin(E
H
q Eq)λi(MqQq)
)
. (6.2.7)
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where (6.2.4) follows from (6.2.1) and (6.2.2); (6.2.5) follows from [107, The-
orem 1.2.12]; (6.2.6) follows from Weyl’s Theorem [107, Theorem 4.3.1];1
and (6.2.7) follows from [109, Fact 8.19.17].2
Now,
λmin(E
H
q Eq) = λmin
(
I+∆Hq H
−H
qq +H
−1
qq ∆q
+∆Hq H
−H
qq H
−1
qq ∆q
)
, (6.2.8)
≥ 1 + λmin
(
∆Hq H
−H
qq +H
−1
qq ∆q
)
+λmin
(
∆Hq H
−H
qq H
−1
qq ∆q
)
, (6.2.9)
≥ 1− 2σmax
(
H−1qq ∆q
)
+λmin
(
∆Hq H
−H
qq H
−1
qq ∆q
)
, (6.2.10)
≥ 1− 2σmax
(
H−1qq ∆q
)
+λmin
(
H−Hqq H
−1
qq
)
λmin
(
∆Hq ∆q
)
, (6.2.11)
≥ 1− 2σmax
(
H−1qq ∆q
)
(6.2.12)
≥ 1− 2σmin
(
H−1qq
)
σmax
(
∆q
)
, (6.2.13)
= 1− 2
σmax
(
∆q
)
σmax
(
Hqq
) , (6.2.14)
1Let A,B ∈ CN×N be Hermitian. For each k = 1, 2, . . . , N , we have
λk(A) + λmin(B) ≤ λk(A+B) ≤ λk(A) + λmax(B).
2Let A,B ∈ CN×N be Hermitian and positive definite. For each k = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
we have
λk(A)λmin(B) ≤ λk(AB) ≤ λk(A)λmax(B).
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≥ 1−
2ǫq
σmax
(
Hqq
) , (6.2.15)
where (6.2.9) follows from Weyl’s Theorem [107, 4.3.1]; (6.2.10) follows
from [109, Fact 5.11.25]; (6.2.11) follows from [109, Fact 8.19.17]; (6.2.13)
follows from [109, Proposition 9.6.6] and (6.2.15) follows from the definition
of Frobenius norm.
Using (6.2.15) in (6.2.7), the protection function for user q can be for-
mulated as
R˜q(Qq,Q−q) ≥
nq∑
i=1
log
(
1 + γqλi(MqQq)
)
, (6.2.16)
= log det
(
I+ γqH
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)HqqQq
)
, (6.2.17)
where (6.2.17) follows from [107, Theorem 1.2.12] and γq is defined as
γq , 1−
2ǫq
σmax
(
Hqq
) . (6.2.18)
Note that the lower bound indicated by γq could be too loose if the
uncertainty bound ǫq is too high or if the largest singular value of the direct
channel, σmax(Hqq) is too small. In particular, this could lead to γq ≤ 0.
However, λmin(E
H
q Eq) ≥ 0. Hence, the range of γq is limited to 0 < γq ≤ 1.
Based on the protection function in (6.2.17), the robust MIMO rate-
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maximization game can be mathematically formulated as
G
M
rob
max
Qq
log det
(
I+ γqH
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)HqqQq
)
s. t. Qq ∈ Qq
∀q ∈ Ω (6.2.19)
where Ω , {1, . . . , Q} is the set of theQ players (i.e. MIMO links), Rq(Qq,Q−q)
is the payoff function of player q as given in (6.1.4) and the set of admissible
strategies of player q, Qq, is defined as
Qq ,
{
Q ∈ CnTq×nTq : Q  0, Tr(Qq) = Pq
}
. (6.2.20)
The inequality constraint in (6.1.6) is replaced with the equality constraint
in (6.2.20) as, at the optimum of each problem in (6.2.19), the constraint
must be satisfied with equality [99].
Note that the quantity γq of user q is dependent only on its own direct-
channel Hqq and its uncertainty bound ǫq, and thus does not need any addi-
tional information (other than the uncertainty bound), such as other users’
transmit covariances or channel matrices, when computing the robust so-
lutions. Furthermore, the quantity γq is related to the relative uncertainty
in the direct channel matrices (determined by the ratio ǫq/σq(Hqq)). In
addition, this formulation has the advantage of not needing any additional
computational hardware, as the eigendecomposition is performed anyway in
every iteration of the algorithm when computing the waterfilling solutions.
Moreover, the additional computational cost is not going to be significant,
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as the quantity γq needs to be computed only once, at the beginning of the
game.
It can be observed that the robust game GMrob is equivalent to the nominal
game described in Section 3.5 (and in [63]), with the modified channels
{γ
1/2
q Hqq}q∈Ω instead of the original channels {Hqq}q∈Ω.
6.3 Robust-optimization equilibrium
Recall from Section 3.5 that the solution to the nominal game is the Nash
equilibrium. In this game, given Q−q ∈ Q−q , Q1 × · · · ×Qq−1 ×Qq+1 ×
· · ·QQ, the optimum action profile of the players {Q
⋆
q}q∈Ω at equilibrium
must satisfy, ∀q ∈ Ω,
Q⋆q = RWF
M
q (Q
⋆
1, . . . ,Q
⋆
q−1,Q
⋆
q+1, . . . ,Q
⋆
Q) = RWF
M
q (Q
⋆
−q). (6.3.1)
The robust waterfilling operator RWFMq (·) is defined as
RWFMq (Q−q) , Uq(µqI−
1
γq
D−1q )
+UHq (6.3.2)
where µq is chosen to satisfy Tr
(
(µqI−
1
γq
D−1q )
+
)
= Pq. The unitary matrix
of eigenvectors Uq = Uq(Q−q) ∈ C
nTq×nTq and the diagonal matrix Dq =
Dq(Q−q) ∈ R
nTq×nTq
++ are calculated from the eigendecomposition
UqDqU
H
q , H
H
qqR
−1
−q(Q−q)Hqq. (6.3.3)
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Given the MIMO system in (6.1.1), the non-negative matrix Sγ ∈ R
Q×Q
+ is
defined as
[Sγ ]qr ,

1
γq
ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
−1
qq Hrq
)
, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise
(6.3.4)
The sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of
game GMrob is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1. Game G rob has at least one equilibrium for any feasible set
of channel matrices and transmit powers of the users. Furthermore, the
equilibrium is unique if
ρ(Sγ) < 1 (6.3.5)
where Sγ is defined in (6.3.4).
Proof. Refer [63, Theorem 6].
It can be verified that the above condition reduces to the nominal con-
dition (3.5.18) when there is no uncertainty (γq = 1 ∀q ∈ Ω). An iterative
algorithm to compute the equilibrium is presented and characterized in the
following section.
6.3.1 Iterative algorithm for robust waterfilling
Let the discrete set T = N+ = 1, 2, . . . be the set of times at which one or
more users update their strategies. Let Q
(n)
q denote the set of covariance
matrices of user q at the n-th iteration, and let Tq ⊆ T denote the set of
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Algorithm 6.1 – Robust MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Input:
Ω: Set of users in the system
Qq: Set of admissible strategies of user q
Tq: Set of time instants n when the covariance matrix Q
(n)
q of user q
is updated
T : Number of iterations for which the algorithm is run
τ qr (n): Time of the most recent covariance matrix of user r available
to user q at time n
RWFMq (·): Robust waterfilling operation in (6.3.2)
Initialization: n = 0 and Q(0)q ← any Q ∈ Qq, ∀q ∈ Ω
for n = 0 to T do
Q(n+1)q =

RWFMq
(
Q
(τq(n))
−q
)
, if n ∈ Tq,
Q(n)q , otherwise
∀q ∈ Ω,
end for
time instants n when the strategy Q
(n)
q of user q is updated. Let τ qr (n)
denote the time when the most recently perceived interference from user r
was computed by user q at time n (Note that 0 ≤ τ qr (n) ≤ n). Hence, if user
q updates its strategy at time n, then
Q
(
τq(n)
)
−q ,
(
Q
(
τq
1
(n)
)
1 , . . . ,Q
(
τq
q−1
(n)
)
q−1 ,Q
(
τq
q+1
(n)
)
q+1 , . . . ,Q
(
τq
Q
(n)
)
Q
)
. (6.3.6)
A fully distributed asynchronous iterative algorithm to compute the equi-
librium of game GMrob is described in Algorithm 6.1. The convergence of
Algorithm 6.1 is guaranteed under the following sufficiency condition:
Theorem 6.2. The robust MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm, described
in Algorithm 6.1 converges to the unique equilibrium of game GMrob as T →∞
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for any set of feasible initial conditions if (6.3.5) is satisfied.
Proof. Refer [63, Theorem 7].
When the relative uncertainties, i.e, the ratio ǫq/σq(Hqq), of all users is
the same, the quantities γq of all users is identical. In this case, the sufficient
condition in (6.3.5) can be simplified as follows:
Corollary 6.2.1. When the uncertainties of all the users is identical, i.e.,
when γq = γ, ∀q ∈ Ω, the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the
equilibrium and the guaranteed convergence of Algorithm 6.1, described in
(6.3.5), reduces to
ρ(S) < γ (6.3.7)
where S is defined as
[S]qr ,

ρ
(
HHrqH
−H
qq H
−1
qq Hrq
)
, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise
(6.3.8)
This result helps analyze the effect of uncertainty on the set of channel
matrices for which the equilibrium is guaranteed to be unique and Algo-
rithm 6.1 is guaranteed to converge. In the absence of uncertainty, this
occurs when ρ(S) < 1, (Corollary 3.7.1). When the uncertainty bound of
the system increases, the value of γ reduces, and thus, the set of matrices
that satisfy (6.3.7) shrinks. Thus, to achieve a robust solution, there is a
trade-off between allowed uncertainty and guaranteed convergence of the
algorithm.
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6.4 Simulation results
In this section, the average behaviour of the robust MIMO algorithm under
different scenarios is investigated. The effect of the amount of uncertainty,
number of users, the number of transmit/receive antennas of each user and
the level of interference on the average sum-rate of the system are presented
here. Also, these results are compared with the nominal solution (i.e. using
the MIMO waterfilling algorithm (Algorithm 3.2) with erroneous channel
matrices).
The simulation results are provided for a system with Q users averaged
over 10000 trials with random channel matrices. The cross-channel matrices
Hrq ∈ C
Nt×Nr are generated with elements drawn from NC(0, 1) for r 6= q
and the direct-channel matrices Hqq ∈ C
Nt×Nr are generated with elements
drawn from NC(0, d
2
r). The channel uncertainty model is H˜qq , Hqq +∆q
where ‖∆q‖F ≤ ǫ (from (6.1.2)). The specific parameters are provided with
each figure. It is to be noted that the quantity dr is the ratio between the
standard deviation of the elements of the random direct-channel matrices
and the standard deviation of the elements of the random cross-channel
matrices. A higher value of dr indicates weaker interference in the system.
In Figure 6.1, it can be observed that the sum-rate under the robust solu-
tion improves with rise in uncertainty while the sum-rate under the nominal
solution falls with increase in uncertainty. This gap in performance can be
observed to be zero under zero uncertainty (since the two solutions coincide)
and rise to about 1.2 nats/transmission when the uncertainty bound is 0.5.
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The average number of iterations required to converge to the robust solu-
tion against the uncertainty bound of the system is depicted in Figure 6.2. It
can be observed that the robust solution takes longer to converge with higher
uncertainty in the system, rising from about 6 iterations at zero uncertainty
to about 8 iterations when the uncertainty bound is 0.5.
In Figure 6.3, the average sum-rate of a system with 2 users is plotted
against the number of transmit/receive antennas of each user. It can be
observed that the average sum-rate of the robust solution increases with the
number of antennas, from about 10 nats/transmission when there are 2 an-
tennas to about 13 nats/transmission when it is increased to 6 antennas,
as expected in MIMO systems. Furthermore, the robust waterfilling solu-
tion consistently performs better than the nominal solution for the observed
number of transmit/receive antennas, retaining an improvement of about 1
nat/transmission.
Figure 6.4 demonstrates the effect of number of users on the average
sum-rate of the system. Increasing the number of users from 2 users to 6
users results in a lower sum-rate, reducing from about 8.5 nats/transmission
to about 6 nats/transmission. This is because a higher number of users in
the system results in more interference for all users, given a fixed value of
dr. In addition, it can be observed that the robust solution performs better
than the nominal solution regardless of the number of users in the system.
In Figure 6.5, the effect of the level of interference on the average
sum-rate of the system is demonstrated. The average sum-rate at the ro-
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Figure 6.1: Sum-rate vs. channel uncertainty bound, ǫ.
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Figure 6.2: Average number of iterations for convergence vs. channel
uncertainty bound.
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Figure 6.3: Sum-rate vs. number of transmit/receive antennas of each
user.
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Figure 6.4: Sum-rate vs. number of users.
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Figure 6.5: Sum-rate vs. direct-channel matrix standard deviation, dr.
bust solution increases with reduction in interference, rising from about 7.5
nats/transmission when dr is 0.75 to about 12 nats/transmission when dr
is 2. Note that a higher value of dr indicates weaker interference in the
system. It can also be observed that the gap in performance between the
robust solution and the nominal solution is higher when the system has
higher interference (1 nat/transmission when dr is 0.75) and falls with re-
duction in interference (0.2 nats/transmission when dr is 2). This can be
explained as follows: the robust solution encourages each user to be less
greedy, which results in lower interference for all users. In systems with
stronger cross-channel matrices, this plays a greater role in determining the
observed information rates of the users, when compared to systems with
weak cross-channel matrices. Thus, when dr increases, the robust solution
Section 6.5. Summary 166
moves closer to the nominal solution.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, a robust formulation for the rate-maximization game in
MIMO Gaussian interference channels in the presence of bounded channel
uncertainty was developed. Inspired from the robust game model, best re-
sponse of each user was based on a lower bound of the payoff function (pro-
tection function) and resulted in a distribution-free equilibrium solution.
Furthermore, the robust MIMO rate-maximization game was observed to
be equivalent to the nominal MIMO rate-maximization game with modified
direct-channel matrices. This enabled the characterization and computation
of the equilibrium utilizing an iterative waterfilling algorithm. Finally, sim-
ulation results demonstrated that the robust solution leads to better global
performance, with higher achieved sum-rates.
Chapter 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS
AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, the novel results of this thesis and the conclusions that can
be drawn from them are summarized, followed by a discussion on future
work that this work could lead to.
7.1 Summary and conclusions
The focus of this thesis has been the design of distributed algorithms to
maximize the information rates of users in single-antenna and multi-antenna
Gaussian interference channels in the presence of uncertainty in channel state
information based on game theory.
In Chapter 1, the challenge of multiuser interference in next-generation
wireless technologies was given as the motivation for the work contained
in this thesis. Game theory has evolved as a suitable framework to design
resource allocation schemes for such users. The majority of the current liter-
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ature on game-theoretic solutions for resource allocation in wireless commu-
nications has assumed the availability of perfect channel knowledge, which
is not possible in a practical situation. Hence, this thesis addressed the
need for the analysis of the effect of imperfect channel knowledge on the
performance of such game-theoretic methods and for the design of robust
game-theoretic solutions which perform satisfactorily despite having imper-
fect channel knowledge.
In Chapter 2, relevant concepts from game theory have been briefly de-
scribed. This included an overview of game theory and its underlying as-
sumptions, followed by an introduction to the strategic noncooperative game
and the concept of the Nash equilibrium. This was followed by a discussion
on the idea of equilibrium efficiency and a few popular measures to quantify
it. Finally, the limitations of the concept of the Nash equilibrium have been
considered, and a robust optimization based approach to mitigating uncer-
tainty in game theory called the robust game model has been introduced as
the basis for the solutions presented in this thesis.
In Chapter 3, the conceptual foundations from fixed point theory, con-
traction mapping and information theory underpinning the work presented
in this thesis have been summarized. In addition, this chapter introduced
the specific game-theoretic problem formulations under which the issue of
channel uncertainty is considered in this thesis. Finally, the effect of channel
uncertainty on the performance of the MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm,
which demonstrates the need for robust solutions, has been investigated in
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this chapter.
In Chapter 4, a review of the current literature addressing the issue of un-
certainty in rate-maximization games for interference channels has been pre-
sented. Following this, a robust formulation for the rate-maximization game
in SISO frequency-selective Gaussian interference channels under bounded
channel uncertainty has been developed. A distribution-free robust optimiza-
tion equilibrium for this problem has been derived and proved to exist for all
feasible channel realizations and to be unique under certain sufficient con-
ditions. An iterative algorithm to compute the equilibrium in a distributed
fashion has also been developed and shown to asymptotically converge when
the equilibrium is unique. Simulation results have confirmed the behaviour
of the algorithm and also have revealed an interesting effect of improvement
in sum-rate of the system when channel uncertainty increases.
In Chapter 5, the improvement in sum-rate with increase in uncertainty
that was observed in the previous chapter has been analytically investigated
in a two-user setting. Based on the analysis of a simple two-frequency system,
sufficient conditions for the improvement of sum-rate and price of anarchy
in a system with asymptotically large number of frequencies with increase in
uncertainty have been derived. In a nutshell, these results indicate that the
robust-optimization equilibrium moves towards a frequency division multiple
access (FDMA) solution as the uncertainty increases, thereby resulting in
the improvement of sum-rate and price of anarchy when FDMA solutions
are known to be globally optimal.
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In Chapter 6, a robust formulation for the rate-maximization game in
MIMO Gaussian interference channels in the presence of bounded channel
uncertainty has been developed. The robust game thus developed has been
shown to be equivalent to the nominal MIMO rate-maximization game with
modified channel matrices. The robust-optimization equilibrium for this
game and an iterative algorithm to compute it distributively have been pre-
sented and characterized. Numerical simulations on the behaviour of this
solution have indicated that the robust solution (in the presence of channel
uncertainty) performs better than the nominal solution (with perfect channel
knowledge), similar to the robust SISO iterative waterfilling algorithm.
Based on the results presented in this thesis, it can be concluded that
a robust game theoretic approach which unifies robust optimization tech-
niques and traditional noncooperative game theory is a suitable approach
to addressing channel uncertainty in rate-maximization games. Worst-case
robust optimization is often too conservative in traditional single-objective
optimization problems (such as beamformer design [110]) in order to en-
sure zero outage which results in a loss in performance. However, such a
worst-case approach results in having the opposite effect in the multi-user
game-theoretic setting where there are multiple coupled optimization prob-
lems.
The conservative solutions forced upon each user by worst-case optimiza-
tion reduces their greediness which causes lesser interference to the other
users in the system. When the system has significant interference (i.e. the
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cross-channels are comparable to the direct-channels), such a conservative
approach by all users results in reduced interference for all users, which
in turn leads to improved information rates for the users. This provides
valuable insight into the design of better utility functions and mechanisms
which, in some fashion, encourages reduced competition among selfish users
(in the form of interference) and yields solutions which are closer to Pareto
optimality, and yet enable distributed computation.
7.2 Future work
There are several directions in which the research presented in this thesis
can be extended. The solutions presented here are for systems with open
spectrum access, but they could be extended to the cognitive radio sce-
nario, where there is an interference constraint which limits the interference
observed at a licensed user. In addition, the robust MIMO iterative wa-
terfilling algorithm presented in Chapter 6 is limited to square nonsingular
channels, and can be extended to apply to systems with arbitrary channels.
Another problem that could be considered is the robust rate-maximization
game for MIMO systems with not just a total power constraint, but also a
per-antenna power constraint. Also, the robust MIMO iterative waterfill-
ing algorithm considers only uncertainty in the channel matrices, but not in
the estimation of the covariance matrix of noise-plus-multiuser interference.
Accounting for uncertainty in the estimation of the covariance matrix is par-
ticularly challenging, as such an estimation occurs in every iteration of the
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algorithm, and will lead to the breakdown of the definition of fixed points in
such cases.
The robust solutions and techniques proposed in this thesis could also be
extended to other power-control problems such as utilized power minimiza-
tion subject to quality-of-service (QoS) constraints. This leads to problem
formulations beyond the Nash equilibrium, in the area of nonlinear comple-
mentary problems and variational inequalities.
Another issue of interest is the behaviour of robust waterfilling algorithms
in the multiple equilibria regime (when the cross-channels are very strong),
which has received attention only recently for the situation when there is
perfect channel knowledge [96]. Some of the questions that are of interest
are: Is the multiplicity of equilibria affected by channel uncertainty? Are
certain equilibria favoured at certain levels of uncertainty? Does the update
order of the algorithm affect convergence and/or the equilibrium achieved?
Does the initialization affect the convergence and/or equilibrium achieved?
Security considerations in the robust SISO iterative waterfilling algo-
rithm presented in Chapter 4 are also of interest. This algorithm assumes
public knowledge of the power allocation vectors, and has no safeguards
against malicious users reporting false values. Designing mechanisms which
discourage collusion and jamming though such means are necessary.
The methods proposed in this thesis also assume quasi-stationarity of
the environment for the duration of the game. Extending these solutions
to the dynamic case where channels could be changing states is of interest.
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Another open problem of this general area is the scalability issue, as the
Nash equilibrium has significant limitations when there are large number of
users in the systems, each having large action-spaces.
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